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INTRODUCTION 
Words and images do not worm their way into our 
discourse by accident; they’re generally thrust there 
by well-orchestrated campaigns intended to burn 
them into our collective consciousness.  Having 
embarked on that endeavor, the originator of the 
symbol necessarily—and justly—must give up 
some measure of control.  The originator must 
understand that the mark or symbol or image is no 
longer entirely its own, and that in some sense it 
also belongs to all those other minds who have 
received and integrated it.  This does not imply a 
total loss of control, however, only that the public’s 
right to make use of the word or image must be 
considered in the balance as we decide what rights 
the owner is entitled to assert.1 
In September of 2005, Justin Watt posted a digitally altered 
image of a billboard to his website.2  The billboard queried: 
“Straight? Unhappy? www.gay.com.”3  Watt’s image was his 
tongue-in-cheek response to real-life billboards that Exodus 
International, “a Christian organization whose objective is to make 
gay people heterosexual through religion and counseling,” had 
placed throughout the U.S.4  Exodus’s original ad had read: “Gay? 
Unhappy? www.exodus.to.”5  Of course, no good deed goes 
unpunished, and sure enough, Exodus’s attorney from the Liberty 
Counsel sent a cease-and-desist letter to Watt on March 2, 2006.6  
The letter claimed that Watt’s image infringed Exodus’s copyright 
in the billboard; it further proclaimed that the “altered image 
 
 1 Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 975 (1993). 
 2 Lia Miller, Both Sides in Parody Dispute Agree on a Term: Unhappy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, 2006, at C7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/technology/27 
straight.html?scp=3&sq=Justin%20Watt&st=cse.  
 3 Justin Watt, My First Cease-and-Desist Letter, JUSTINSOMNIA (Mar. 2, 2006, 11:08 
AM), http://justinsomnia.org/2006/03/my-first-cease-and-desist-letter (displaying Watt’s 
parodic billboard); see also Miller, supra note 2.  
 4 Miller, supra note 2. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Watt, supra note 3 (displaying Letter from Mathew D. Staver, Founder and 
Chairman, Liberty Counsel to Justin Watt (no date available)).  
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substantially diminishes the potential value of the original image as 
utilized by Exodus on billboards across America and online.”7  
Moreover, Exodus alleged that Watt’s use allegedly created a sense 
of false sponsorship, as he had kept Exodus’s “E” logo in his send-
up of the billboard.8  Because Exodus claimed that Watt had 
misconstrued any fair use he might have made of the image, the 
organization instructed Watt to 
immediately cease use of the image on your web 
site or in any other form.  Please confirm your 
agreement to this request, and please note your 
confirmation that no other use is being or will be 
made of the images or logo, by signing and 
returning an original signature on a copy of this 
letter at the address shown above . . . .9 
Although Exodus’s assertion of trademark rights ostensibly 
focused on the fact that Watt’s image conveyed a false impression 
of sponsorship, the subtext of Exodus’s trademark allegation was 
that Watt had tarnished its mark by using its imagery and 
subverting its message.  In other words, Watt’s positive reference 
to homosexuality in his image prompted Exodus, the trademark 
and copyright owner, to cry foul.  Faced with Exodus’s assertion of 
intellectual property rights, Justin Watt did not capitulate.  Instead, 
the ACLU and a Bay Area law firm agreed to represent him, and 
they countered with a letter enumerating Watt’s fair use rights 
under copyright law and First Amendment rights under trademark 
law.10  Shortly thereafter, Exodus dropped its case against Watt.11 
Flash forward to 2010.  A blog following the progress of Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger12 adopted a logo for its website deliberately 
 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id.  
 10 See Letter from Laurence F. Pulgram, Partner, Fenwick & West LLP, to Mathew D. 
Staver, Chairman and Founder, Liberty Counsel (no date available), available at 
http://justinsomnia.org/2006/03/a-response-to-liberty.  
 11 See Miller, supra note 2. 
 12 --- F. Supp. 2d ----, No. C 09-2292 VRW, 2010 WL 3025614 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 
2010). 
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similar to that of an arch-nemesis, ProtectMarriage.com.13  
ProtectMarriage.com’s logo had depicted a mother, father, and two 
children (which is reminiscent of the silhouettes used to demarcate 
men’s and women’s restrooms).14  The mark embodied 
ProtectMarriage.com’s ideal of the traditional family.  Prop 8 Trial 
Tracker, however, reworked the logo to depict two mothers and 
two children, a self-admitted parody of ProtectMarriage.com’s 
trademark.15  And like Justin Watt, Courage Campaign promptly 
received a cease-and-desist letter from ProtectMarriage.com, 
which vigorously asserted its copyright and trademark rights in the 
image.16  ProtectMarriage.com alleged, inter alia, that the 
reworking of its logo would lead to a likelihood of confusion.17  In 
its response letter, Courage Campaign’s counsel from Morrison & 
Foerster cited precedent asserting Courage Campaign’s right to 
parody the ProtectMarriage.com mark under trademark and 
copyright law, and argued that under established trademark law, 
there would be no likelihood of confusion.18  While the 
ProtectMarriage.com cease-and-desist letter did not explicitly 
mention tarnishment, the letter highlighted that “Courage 
Campaign holds views that are diametrically opposed to 
ProtectMarriage.com.”19  No doubt it took umbrage at Courage 
Campaign’s parodic riffing on its trademark.  Courage Campaign, 
 
 13 Julia Rosen, ProtectMarriage.com Issues Cease and Desist for Prop 8 Trial Tracker 
Logo Depicting Family of Two Mothers with Two Kids, PROP 8 TRIAL TRACKER (Jan. 15, 
2010), http://prop8trialtracker.com/2010/01/15/protectmarriage-com-issues-cease-and-
desist-for-prop-8-trial-tracker-logo.  The Courage Campaign Institute created the Prop 8 
Trial Tracker site. About, PROP 8 TRIAL TRACKER, http://prop8trialtracker.com/about (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010).  
 14 Rosen, supra note 13 (displaying Letter from John M. Skeriotis, Partner, Brouse 
McDowell LPA, to Richard D. Jacobs, Founder and Chair, Courage Campaign (Jan. 12, 
2010)). 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id.  
 17 Id. 
 18 See id. (displaying Letter from Nathan B. Sabri, Associate, Morrison Foerster LLP, 
to John M. Skeriotis, Partner, Brouse McDowell LPA (Jan. 14, 2010)).  
 19 Id. (displaying Letter from John M. Skeriotis, Partner, Brouse McDowell LPA, to 
Richard D. Jacobs, Founder and Chair, Courage Campaign (Jan. 12, 2010)). 
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on the other hand, recoded a mark it deemed offensive to provide 
commentary and empowerment in its fight for marriage equality.20 
As Watt’s and Courage Campaign’s experiences demonstrate, 
brands of all shapes, sizes, and political persuasions are 
ubiquitous21 and sometimes even insidious.  Moreover, brands 
have become part of our daily fabric and lexicon.22  As our brand-
awareness has increased, so has our ability to imbue brands with 
meaning,23 whether these meanings accord with the brand identity 
a company intends to convey or not.  Individuals seek to comment 
on and fight brand hegemony by, for example, poking fun at a 
particularly cloying cultural symbol,24 or by subverting and 
recoding a brand’s intended message.25 
Trademark owners, however, benefit from a variety of causes 
of action, such as trademark infringement and trademark dilution, 
 
 20 How ProtectMarriage.com Can Get Back at Courage Campaign’s Logo Lift: Gay-
Up CC’s Logo, QUEERTY, http://www.queerty.com/how-protectmarriage-com-can-get-
back-at-courage-campaigns-logo-lift-gay-up-ccs-logo-20100116/#ixzz0k6CWWZXc 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2010).  
 21 See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive 
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 511 (2008) (“Consumers are inundated with ads, not just in 
traditional media but in bathroom stalls, sidewalk decals, even ads covering the paint 
strips in parking lots.”).  
 22 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as 
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990) (arguing that 
expressive uses of marks should be allowed under the doctrine of “expressive 
genericity”).  
 23 See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: 
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 57 (1998) (“The consumption of 
commodified representational forms is productive activity in which people engage in 
meaning-making to adapt signs, texts, and images to their own agendas.  These practices 
of appropriation or ‘recoding’ cultural forms are the essence of popular culture, 
understood by theorists of postmodernism to be central to the political practice of those in 
subordinate social groups and marginal to the centers of cultural production.”).  
 24 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902, 906–07 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that the group Aqua’s tongue-in-cheek song, “Barbie Girl,” was not an 
actionable use under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and that it was a successful 
parody).  
 25 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 
2003) (maintaining that the artist provided social commentary on Barbie by placing 
“carefully positioned, nude, and sometimes frazzled looking Barbies in often ridiculous 
and apparently dangerous situations”); NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 280 (2d ed. 2002) 
(describing “culture jamming, the practice of parodying advertisements and hijacking 
billboards in order to drastically alter their messages”).  
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which they often wield to silence commentary on their marks.26  
This clash of trademark law with freedom of expression is 
especially unsettling when a trademark owner uses trademark law 
to silence speech it finds offensive and unseemly, specifically 
when related to sex and sexuality.  Mark owners do so in order to 
shield their carefully cultivated brand images from tarnishment; 
often, however, they do so bluntly without distinguishing between 
truly prurient associations and those that are merely linked with 
expressions of sexual orientation that deviate from the societal 
norm.  Even more unsettling is that trademark owners can often 
silence speech that they deem distasteful without recourse to a 
formal adjudication—they may simply draft an artfully worded 
cease-and-desist letter asserting their intellectual property rights. 
Justin Watt’s predicament is not uncommon.  Nor was Prop 8 
Trial Tracker’s skirmish with ProtectMarriage.com.  A simple 
search on Google for cease-and-desist letters brings up thousands 
of hits.  The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse catalogues and 
displays letters sent to companies and individuals.27  These 
communiqués have become increasingly common, even as courts 
concomitantly seek to reign in trademark law’s grasp, especially in 
the dilution context.28  Thus, while courts have become 
increasingly more receptive to protecting speech that trademark 
 
 26 See COOMBE, supra note 23, at 72 (“Concepts as vague as loss of distinctiveness and 
tarnishment have the capacity to escalate into a general power to prohibit all 
reproductions of a mark and ‘grow into a powerful vehicle for the suppression of 
unwelcome speech.’” (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: 
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 190)).  
 27 The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse is “[a] joint project of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and Harvard, Stanford, Berkeley, University of San Francisco, University of 
Maine, George Washington School of Law, and Santa Clara University School of Law 
clinics.” CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2010).  
 28 Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2006) (“Judicial 
enforcement of dilution law is not robust today and has been eroding over time. . . .  
[R]elief rates have been on a downward trajectory since then.  It could well be the case 
that dilution law is a powerful bargaining chip in cease-and-desist letters and in 
negotiations entirely outside the litigatory arena.  In the federal courts, however, dilution 
cases are not exactly a juggernaut.  That is not to say that dilution law lacks seductive 
appeal, but rather that is seems not to have worked its wiles on the judicial mind as many 
feared.”).  
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owners say is tarnishing (especially as applied to sexually 
connotative uses or uses that reference a mark in association with 
sexuality), cease-and-desist letters make an end-run around 
judicially and statutorily created protective doctrines by 
preempting this kind of speech before it can even get into court. 
Current cease-and-desist practice raises many concerns, not the 
least of which is that cease-and-desist letters have become a form 
of private-action prior restraint arguably more potent than 
preliminary injunctions.  Indeed, to the uninitiated lay person, a 
cease-and-desist letter is often the death-knell to his or her non-
actionable use of a trademark.  As Professor Ramsay aptly puts it, 
“Those who cannot afford to litigate will self-censor rather than 
fight for their right of free expression.”29  Thus, the real struggle is 
to craft protection from the chilling power of cease-and-desist 
letters that assert rights beyond the permissible scope of trademark 
doctrine.  Moreover, it is most often behemoth companies policing 
their brands who send these letters to defendants who cannot bear 
the costs of litigation.30  While many scholars recommend honing 
trademark doctrine to avoid this chilling effect,31 others focus on 
procedural protections that may curb overreaching by trademark 
owners.  More well-reasoned doctrinal interpretations will 
arguably elucidate standards for those well-versed in trademark 
law, however, they may be inaccessible to the layperson.  For this 
reason, procedural protections may have a more deterrent effect on 
mark holders.  Ultimately, the law must craft an effective 
combination of doctrinal adjustments and procedural mechanisms 
while ensuring that the average layperson is aware of those rights. 
 
 29 Lisa P. Ramsay, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU 
L. REV. 381, 381 (2008).  
 30 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence 
from the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449, 458 n.36 (“It may well be that the primary success of 
antidilution law to date is that it empowers potential plaintiffs with a greater ability to 
threaten potential defendants, particularly those that are unsophisticated, with prohibitive 
litigation costs.”).  
 31 See, e.g., William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
49, 109–22 (2008) [hereinafter McGeveran, Rethinking]. 
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Part I of this Note will examine how tarnishment causes of 
action in the courts have become increasingly more favorable to 
defendants who use trademarks in reference to sexuality or in 
sexually connotative ways.  Part II, on the other hand, will 
emphasize the distinction between recodings that are sexually 
explicit or overtly suggestive and those that express ideas about 
and attributes of sexual orientation.  Arguably, uses in the latter 
category are generally more worthy of protection from a First 
Amendment standpoint.  Further, it will illustrate how cease-and-
desist letters have sought to silence these kinds of uses and why 
this is especially problematic for marginalized groups, such as the 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender community.  Many mark 
owners thus make an end-run around built-in statutory and First 
Amendment speech protections that defendants may use in 
litigation.  Indeed, this Part will underscore that several scholars 
see this free-wheeling use of cease-and-desist letters as an abusive 
litigation tactic.  Part III will juxtapose doctrinal solutions to this 
problem, including clarification of the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act’s exemptions and a proper substantive definition of 
tarnishment, with procedural remedies, which include reviving the 
trademark misuse doctrine, utilizing anti-SLAPP statutes, and fee-
shifting.  Finally, this Note will suggest that any doctrinal changes 
must be accompanied by procedural remedies, which may be more 
effective in curbing abusive behavior.  This Note will also propose 
further steps that the law should take to allow trademark recoders 
and parodists to act affirmatively when faced with a cease-and-
desist letter, including the complete abolishment of tarnishment as 
an actionable offense under trademark law. 
I. TARNISHMENT: A MORE PROLIFIC PAST AND DWINDLING 
PRESENT? 
While tarnishment has had an influential (and some would say 
ignominious) influence on trademark law, its presence in litigated 
cases has increasingly dwindled.32  Moreover, courts have arguably 
 
 32 See Beebe, supra note 30, at 450 (“Most significantly, the case law shows the 
remarkable extent to which courts continue to treat the dilution cause of action as 
redundant of—and, thus, made superfluous by—the infringement cause of action.  For all 
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become more and more sympathetic to defendants who seek to use 
trademarks in ways that mark owners may deem offensive and 
inconsistent with their brand’s image.33  This Part will briefly 
examine the genesis of dilution and tarnishment and discuss the 
evolution of case law as it applies to uses of marks that are 
sexually explicit or that reference sexuality.34 
A. A Brief Primer on the Tarnishment Cause of Action 
Dilution law has its genesis in Frank I. Schecter’s seminal 
article, The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, published in 
1927.35  In his article, Schecter expressed concern about 
the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the 
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark 
or name by its use upon non-competing goods.  The 
more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is 
its impress upon the public consciousness, and the 
greater its need for protection against vitiation or 
dissociation from the particular product in 
connection with which it has been used.36 
Under existing trademark law at that time, “protection was 
unlikely from a mark’s appropriation for goods of different 
descriptive properties.”37  Instead, trademark law was confined to 
its twin rationales: protecting consumers from confusion and 
deception and trademark owners from unfair competition.38  
 
of the legislative and academic attention paid to it, antidilution law continues to have no 
appreciable effect on the outcomes of federal trademark cases or the remedies issuing 
from those outcomes.”); Long, supra note 28, at 1057 (“Tarnishment is generally not a 
popular theory of dilution among trademark plaintiffs.  Courts have tended not to favor 
tarnishment theory of dilution either.”); infra Part I.B.5. 
 33 See infra Part I.B. 
 34 At the outset, it is important to underscore that these two kinds of trademark 
recodings are not equivalent, and that references to sexuality often do not have any 
sexually explicit content. 
 35 Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813 (1927).  
 36 Id. at 825. 
 37 Jerre B. Swann, Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 585, 
587 (2002).  
 38 Mark McKenna contends, however, that trademark law traditionally was primarily 
premised on unfair competition and that benefits to consumers’ interests, while “welcome 
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Indeed, it was not until twenty years later that Massachusetts 
became the first state to enact a dilution statute,39 and states 
thereafter began to extend protection beyond the traditional 
likelihood of confusion context.40  As Professor Long has noted, 
“[D]ilution law is producer-focused rather than consumer-
focused . . . .  [Its] underlying assumption is that the unauthorized 
use of a famous mark by third parties, even when consumers are 
not confused by the use of the mark, can diminish the mark’s 
selling power.”41  Dilution remained a “creature of state law,”42 
however, until 1995, when Congress passed the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act (the “FTDA”).43  Prior to the enactment of the FTDA, 
however, federal courts often got into the fray and helped 
“‘defin[e] the doctrine’s parameters.’”44 
In crafting the scope of this doctrine, federal courts recognized 
that a mark could be diluted in two ways: first, by blurring, “where 
the defendant uses or modifies the plaintiff’s trademark to identify 
the defendant’s goods and services, raising the possibility the mark 
will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiff’s 
product;”45 and second, by tarnishment, whereby “the plaintiff’s 
 
byproducts,” were a secondary consideration. Mark McKenna, Testing Modern 
Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 72 (2009); see also Mark 
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1839, 1848 (2007) (“Trademark law, indeed all of unfair competition law, was designed 
to promote commercial morality and protect producers from illegitimate attempts to 
divert their trade.  Consumer confusion was relevant to the traditional determination of 
infringement not for its own sake, but because deceiving consumers was a particularly 
effective way of stealing a competitor’s trade.”).  
 39 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 430 (2003).  
 40 See Sarah L. Burstein, Dilution by Tarnishment: The New Cause of Action, 98 
TRADEMARK REP. 1189, 1193 (2008). 
 41 Long, supra note 28, at 1034. 
 42 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 43 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996), 
repealed by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 
1730.  
 44 Burstein, supra note 40, at 1199 (quoting Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: 
Towards a Reconciliation with the Lanham Act, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 105, 108–09 (1995)).  As Burstein notes, “in interpreting state dilution statutes, it was 
not uncommon for courts to cite general propositions about dilution law from non-
binding decisions in other jurisdictions that were interpreting different, though similarly-
worded, state statutes.” Id. 
 45 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).  
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trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality or is portrayed in 
an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering 
thoughts about the owner’s product.”46 As Sarah Burstein notes, 
however, tarnishment case law was often “inconsistent” before the 
enactment of the FTDA, and further, “very few cases were decided 
on tarnishment alone.”47  Part of this inconsistency arose because 
courts sometimes conflated tarnishment with their likelihood of 
confusion analyses;48 at other times, courts varied in their 
willingness to afford speech protection to defendants who had 
allegedly tarnished a plaintiff’s mark.49 
After the FTDA took effect in 1996, courts continued to rely on 
pre-FTDA case law for tarnishment standards.50  At the same time, 
the FTDA sought to avoid some of the prior inconsistency in case 
law based on state statutes by providing that 
the owner of a mark could obtain relief against a 
junior user if: (1) the senior mark was famous; (2) 
the junior user made “commercial use in commerce 
of a mark or trade name;” (3) which use started after 
the senior user’s mark became famous; (4) and 
which “cause[d] dilution of the distinctive quality” 
of the senior user’s mark.51 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 Burstein, supra note 40, at 1200.  
 48 See, e.g., MGM-Pathe Commc’ns, Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 
871–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting a permanent injunction ostensibly on solely 
infringement grounds, but allowing considerations of tarnishment to enter the likelihood 
of confusion analysis); Burstein, supra note 40, at 1203.  
 49 Compare L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(“The Constitution does not, however, permit the range of the anti-dilution statute to 
encompass the unauthorized use of a trademark in a noncommercial setting such as an 
editorial or artistic context.”), with Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat 
Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Plaintiff’s trademark is in the nature of 
a property right, and as such it need not ‘yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights 
under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.’” 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))).  
 50 See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 
1996) (citing pre-FTDA case law).  
 51 Burstein, supra note 40, at 1196 (quoting Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 
Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (1996), repealed by Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730). 
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The federal act thus required that the senior mark be famous, 
and, in recognition of the more expressive uses of trademarks, 
required that the junior make “commercial use in commerce of a 
mark.”52  Although the “commercial use in commerce” 
requirement was awkwardly worded at best, it may have been 
merely “an attempt by Congress to make absolutely clear that 
noncommercial uses were not actionable.”53  Moreover, seeking to 
avoid the inconsistency in exemptions courts had crafted when 
applying state dilution statutes, the FTDA provided three 
exemptions: “(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in 
comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the 
competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark[;] 
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark[; and] (C) All forms of news 
reporting and news commentary.”54  Following the enactment of 
this law, however, courts were still not clear as to what kinds of 
uses would fall under the “noncommercial use” exemption, and 
some struggled to apply the statute to allegedly tarnishing uses of a 
trademark owner’s mark.55 
When the federal dilution standards failed to provide adequate 
clarity for the courts as to what kind of evidentiary showing the 
federal dilution action required and what kind of uses it covered, 
Congress stepped in again.  The Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
of 2006 (the “TDRA”) expanded upon the exceptions provided.56  
 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 1228 (emphasis added). 
 54 Id. at 1197 (quoting Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 
3, 109 Stat. 985, 986 (1996), repealed by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730). 
 55 See, e.g., Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 
732–35 (D. Minn. 1998) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that its film title was 
protected under the noncommercial use exemption of the FTDA and further contending 
that First Amendment concerns were unfounded because “alternative avenues for 
expressing the idea exist[ed]”). 
 56 Section 1125(c)(3) reads, in relevant part: 
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or 
dilution by tarnishment under this subsection:  
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, 
or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another 
person other than as a designation of source for the person’s 
own goods or services, including use in connection with— 
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In addition, it expressly incorporated “tarnishment” into the 
Lanham Act and defined it as “association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that 
harms the reputation of the famous mark.”57 
Further exegesis on the statutory development of tarnishment is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important to note that 
while tarnishment has become an express part of the TDRA, courts 
still rely on pre-TDRA and pre-FTDA cases to define what 
constitutes tarnishment of a mark and what tests should be applied 
to determine what uses are actionable.58 
B. Sex and Sexuality in the Tarnishment Case Law: A Mixed Bag? 
As the doctrine of dilution by tarnishment developed in the 
courts, one thing became clear: some courts had a “distaste” for 
content involving sex and sexuality.59  On the other hand, other 
courts were less willing to enjoin speech that included sexual uses 
of a mark on First Amendment grounds.60  To some extent, these 
approaches created inconsistency among the circuits regarding 
how to approach tarnishment and how much First Amendment 
protection a defendant should receive. 
 
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to     
compare goods or services; or 
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting 
upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of 
the famous mark owner. 
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. 
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006).  
 57 Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
 58 See infra Part I.B.1–4.  Indeed, Barton Beebe emphasizes that courts have not 
faithfully applied the new TDRA provisions, applying FTDA exemptions, rationales, and 
case law instead; he aptly maintains that “[t]he dead hand of the FTDA still plagues the 
law.” See Beebe, supra note 30, at 455–58, 467.  
 59 Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and Speech: First Amendment 
Limitations on the Trademark Estate: An Update, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 547, 549–50 
(2004). 
 60 See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(“The basis for the district court’s injunction was that Bean’s trademark had been 
tarnished by the parody in defendant’s magazine.  We think this was a constitutionally 
impermissible application of the anti-dilution statute.”). 
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After the enactment of the FTDA in 1995 and the subsequent 
revision of dilution law in 2006, however, it seemed that courts 
were embracing an increasingly expansive notion of what speech 
would be exempted under federal law.  Moreover, as Professor 
Long’s research has demonstrated, dilution lawsuits are litigated 
less and less.61  This amounts to a greater likelihood of success for 
defendants if tarnishment claims are actually litigated.62 
This section will examine the contours of tarnishment law as it 
applies to sex and sexuality and will highlight some of the 
doctrinal difficulties that have arisen in these cases.  It will also 
draw a distinction between tarnishment cases based on overt 
references to sex and those that involve references to sexuality and 
sexual orientation. 
1. Pre-FTDA Tarnishment 
Pre-FTDA tarnishment cases conflicted in their treatment of 
marks associated with sexuality.  On the one hand, several courts 
evinced a strong concern for marks that were associated with 
pornographic movies or magazines.  While the reputational 
concerns these courts expressed may have had validity, the courts 
did not explain why.  In other words, they did not elucidate what 
particularly is “tarnishing” about the uses, other than to say that the 
contexts in which the defendants used the marks were “revolting”63 
or “depraved.”64  The courts did not circumscribe the scope of 
tarnishment, nor did they define it.  These judicial tendencies 
inevitably raise First Amendment concerns because trademark 
owners may thus silence speech that may not be actionable. 
The paradigmatic case in this area is Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.65  This case involved 
the defendant’s use of a cheerleading uniform that was similar to 
 
 61 See infra Part I.B.5. 
 62 As the next part will demonstrate, this greater likelihood of success is a pyrrhic 
victory for would-be recoders and parodists of famous marks, as cease-and-desist letters 
often chill speech before it can formally receive judicial protection. 
 63 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
 64 Id. at 205. 
 65 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).  
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that of the actual Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ uniforms in 
Debbie Does Dallas, an adult film.66  Specifically, the plaintiff was 
upset by the fact that many of the actresses in the film wore these 
uniforms while performing various sexual acts.67  Moreover, the 
defendants’ movie posters featured captions such as “Starring Ex 
Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader Bambi Woods” and “You’ll do more 
than cheer for this X Dallas Cheerleader.”68  The plaintiff owners 
of the mark sued the defendants for trademark infringement under 
the Lanham Act and for dilution under section 368-d of the New 
York General Business Law.69  The District Court for the Southern 
District of New York issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
the distribution and exhibition of the film.70  The Second Circuit 
later held that the plaintiff’s trade dress had acquired secondary 
meaning and was thus protectable, and that the defendant had 
demonstrated there was a likelihood of both confusion and 
dilution.71  It then affirmed the preliminary injunction issued by the 
district court on both the trademark infringement and state law 
dilution grounds.72 
In its analysis, the court made no efforts to hide its disdain for 
the film—“Debbie Does Dallas,” for example, was “a gross and 
revolting sex film.”73  Indeed, the court’s moral opprobrium 
permeated the opinion.  In holding that there was a likelihood of 
confusion as to the sponsorship of the film, the court proclaimed 
that “it is hard to believe that anyone who had seen defendants’ 
sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from 
plaintiff’s cheerleaders” and that the plaintiff had a right to 
“‘control his product’s reputation.’”74  Strictly speaking, there was 
no likelihood of confusion here;75 rather the court maintained that 
 
 66 Id. at 202–03. 
 67 See id. at 203. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Id. at 202. 
 71 Id. at 205. 
 72 Id. at 207. 
 73 Id. at 202. 
 74 Id. at 205 (quoting James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 
274 (7th Cir. 1976)). 
 75 A finding of likelihood of confusion was more appropriate, however, with respect to 
the defendants’ poster, which claimed that one of the stars was an “X Dallas 
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sponsorship could follow from mere association.76  As one 
commentator has noted, “The finding of a likelihood of confusion 
in the Dallas Cowboys . . . decision[] is best understood as 
reflective of [the] court’s strongly negative reaction to the nature of 
the parody.  Yet the fact that the court[] [was] not amused does not 
mean that consumers are confused.”77  And yet, the court’s dilution 
analysis is all but absent—it seems to presume that dilution will 
occur without examining any of the requirements under New York 
State law for that cause of action. 
Moreover, the court brushed aside any First Amendment 
concerns, brusquely opining: 
That defendants’ movie may convey a barely 
discernible message does not entitle them to 
appropriate plaintiff’s trademark in the process of 
conveying that message.  Plaintiff’s trademark is in 
the nature of a property right, and as such it need 
not “yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights 
under circumstances where adequate alternative 
avenues of communication exist.”78 
Nor was this preliminary injunction an “unconstitutional ‘prior 
restraint.’”79  As the court noted, this case was a private plaintiff’s 
 
Cheerleader.” Id. at 203; see Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay 
Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131, 149–50 (1989) (“The court could have plausibly 
limited its finding of confusion to the film’s advertisements, which falsely suggested that 
the film starred an ex-Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader.  But if the likelihood of confusion 
was limited to the advertisements, the court should have enjoined only the advertisements 
and not blocked exhibition of the film itself.” (footnote omitted)); see also Denicola, 
supra note 26, at 206 (“Yet the sweeping rejection of the defendant’s [F]irst 
[A]mendment claim in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders is dangerously simplistic.”). 
 76 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 204–05. 
 77 Cantwell, supra note 59, at 556; see also Kravitz, supra note 75, at 149–50 (“[I]t 
seems highly unlikely that a reasonable viewer would believe that the Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders in any way sponsored or approved the film, or the use of the uniform, 
simply because a character in the film wore the uniform . . . .  Quite clearly, the court 
primarily based its decision to uphold the plaintiff’s prohibition on the tarnishment 
rationale—that the plaintiff’s reputation would be degraded through association with 
what the court saw as a ‘gross and revolting sex film.’” (quoting Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 202)).  
 78  Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 
407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972)). 
 79 Id. 
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action to “protect its property rights,” and the “prohibition of the 
Lanham Act is content neutral,” therefore, there were no 
constitutional concerns.80 
Thus the Second Circuit’s main concern was protecting the 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ trade dress (their uniform) from 
any unseemly association.  Yet the court did not illustrate the 
contours of properly tarnishing uses, relying instead on a 
“strained” notion of likelihood of confusion.81  The court did not 
elaborate on where to draw the lines between unfavorable, though 
unactionable, uses of a mark and actionable uses, if any lines were 
to be drawn at all.  The court seemed to indicate that a mark owner 
has unfettered rights to control its brand image. 
Even more concerning in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders was 
the court’s flippant treatment of the First Amendment.  As one 
commentator underscored, “This decision to enjoin showings of 
the film to protect the plaintiff’s reputational interest in its 
trademark cannot be reconciled with [F]irst [A]mendment 
principles.  There was no finding that the defendant’s film was 
obscene under [F]irst [A]mendment standards.”82  The court thus 
enjoined this speech because it simply found the film disgusting; it 
never allowed a jury to determine whether this speech was 
obscenity under Miller v. California’s83 standards, nor did it 
attempt to define the contours of tarnishing uses, other than by 
visceral, subjective reactions. 
Similarly, in Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc.,84 
the district court failed to define the scope of tarnishment, while 
providing injunctive relief on dilution grounds.85  In Milky Way 
Productions, the defendant, who owned the adult magazine, Screw, 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Denicola, supra note 26, at 206 (“Although decided by an obviously strained 
reference to the confusion rationale, the court undoubtedly came closer to the true basis 
of its decision when it stated: ‘Indeed, it is hard to believe that anyone who had seen 
defendant’s sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from plaintiff’s 
cheerleaders.’” (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 205)). 
 82 Kravitz, supra note 75, at 150–51. 
 83 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  For an enumeration of the three-pronged Miller test, see infra 
note 303. 
 84 No. C78-679A, 1981 WL 1402 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981).  
 85 Id. at *14. 
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published photos of clay “figures resembling [Pillsbury’s] trade 
characters ‘Poppin’ Fresh’ and ‘Poppie Fresh’” engaged in various 
sexual acts, including fellatio.86  The pictures also contained 
Pillsbury’s trademark and parts of its advertising jingle.87  
Pillsbury sued Milky Way Productions, alleging, inter alia, 
copyright infringement, federal and state trademark infringement, 
and dilution under Georgia law.88  The district court held that there 
was no likelihood of confusion arising from the defendant’s use of 
Pillsbury’s marks, primarily because the “parties’ products and 
retail outlets . . . [were] substantially dissimilar” and there was a 
lack of actual confusion.89 
On the dilution claim, however, the court found that there was 
“a likelihood that the defendants’ presentation could injure the 
business reputation of the plaintiff or dilute the distinctive quality 
of its trademarks.”90  Yet the court did not give a fulsome 
explanation of its reasoning in this part of the decision.  Rather, it 
seemed to agree with the plaintiff that “Milky Way has tarnished 
the reputation, and thereby impaired the effectiveness, of its 
advertising agents by placing them in a ‘depraved context.’”91  But 
what exactly is depravity?  The court does not tell us.92 
 
 86 Id. at *1.  
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at *13. 
 90 Id. at *14.  
 91 Id.  
 92 Similarly, the court in Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 7 
Media L. Rep. 1862 (BNA) (S.D.N.Y. 1981), did not elaborate on what exactly 
tarnishment is.  The case involved a thirteen page spread in High Society magazine of the 
characters Tarzan and Jane engaged in sexual situations. Id. at 1863.  These uses of the 
characters were unauthorized. Id.  In granting a preliminary injunction for the trademark 
owner, the court merely noted that  
[t]he reputation and good will with the public and among publishers, 
motion picture and TV producers, and in the publishing and 
entertainment fields which used the literary works authored by the 
late Edgar Rice Burroughs, the creator of the Tarzan and Jane 
characters and characterizations, have undoubtedly been besmirched, 
tarnished, and debased by the defendants and their magazine. 
Id. at 1864. 
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Despite the lack of clarity concerning tarnishment and 
sexuality in these cases,93 other courts began to rely on them to 
craft a rule in which tarnishment would “generally arise[] when the 
plaintiff’s trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality, or is 
portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke 
unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product.”94  None of these 
courts, however, endeavored to define what constituted 
“unwholesome” or “unsavory.” Tarnishment, then, became a 
highly subjective, case-specific (and judge-specific) inquiry.95 
On the other hand, as Sarah Burstein notes, other courts tried to 
eschew dependence on qualitative assessments of tarnishment in 
favor of a commercial/noncommercial distinction.96  In L.L. Bean, 
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,97 the First Circuit turned a First 
Amendment lens on the Maine anti-dilution statute.  The case 
involved a parodic two-page article in the adult magazine High 
Society.98  The spoof article was entitled “L.L. Beam’s Back-to-
School Sex Catalogue,” and it featured “a facsimile of Bean’s 
trademark . . . and pictures of nude models in sexually explicit 
positions using ‘products’ that were described in a crudely 
 
 93 One commentator even suggests that some “courts believed sexualization to be a per 
se harm leading to dilution by tarnishment.” Leigh A. Hansmann, Comment, Sex, Selling 
Power, and Salacious Commentary: Applying the Copyright Fair Use Doctrine in the 
Trademark Context, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 843, 864.  
 94 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); 
see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(“Courts have frequently enjoined the ‘tarnishment’ of a mark through association with 
unsavory goods, persons or services.”); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (“[T]arnishment . . . 
occurs when a defendant uses the same or similar marks in a way that creates an 
undesirable, unwholesome, or unsavory mental association with the plaintiff’s mark.”).  
 95 See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and 
Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. 
REV. 887, 913 (2005) (“[B]y allowing judges to determine the social value to be accorded 
to expressive works, courts conduct a standardless exercise in imagination and creativity.  
When a court determines liability in cases involving sexuality, obscenity, drug use, or 
other ‘unwholesome’ associations, it runs the risk of transforming itself from a guardian 
of constitutional mandates into a literary and social critic—a demotion the judiciary is ill-
equipped to handle.”).  
 96 See Burstein, supra note 40, at 1212.  
 97 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).  
 98 Id. at 27. 
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humorous fashion.”99  L.L. Bean brought suit for trademark 
infringement and dilution, inter alia, and the district court granted 
summary judgment on the dilution claim, finding that the 
defendant’s article “had tarnished Bean’s trademark by 
undermining the goodwill and reputation associated with the 
mark.”100  At the outset, the First Circuit rejected the district 
court’s reliance on the real property analogy that the Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders court had espoused.101  Moreover, the court 
distinguished Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders by maintaining that 
this case involved an “editorial or artistic” parody, which it 
characterized as noncommercial.102  While acknowledging that 
“the Constitution tolerates an incidental impact on rights of 
expression of commercial actors in order to prevent a defendant 
from unauthorizedly merchandising his products with another’s 
trademark[,]”103 it emphasized that 
If the anti-dilution statute were construed as 
permitting a trademark owner to enjoin the use of 
his mark in a noncommercial context found to be 
negative or offensive, then a corporation could 
shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of 
its name in commentaries critical of its conduct . . . .  
The Constitution does not . . . permit the range of 
the anti-dilution statute to encompass the 
unauthorized use of a trademark in a 
noncommercial setting such as an editorial or 
artistic context.104 
Moreover, it viewed the district court’s evaluation of the 
speech at issue in the case as “an untoward judicial evaluation of 
the offensiveness or unwholesomeness of the appellant’s 
materials.”105  It further maintained that “[t]he central role which 
trademarks occupy in public discourse (a role eagerly encouraged 
 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 29. 
 102 Id. at 32. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 33. 
 105 Id. at 33–34. 
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by trademark owners), makes them a natural target of parodists.  
Trademark parodies, even when offensive, do convey a 
message.”106  Thus, the parody was valuable speech and social 
commentary, however offensive. 
In sum, the First Circuit seemed to find a subjective assessment 
of the parameters of tarnishment itself untenable when it could 
instead rely on a commercial/noncommercial distinction.  To the 
First Circuit, it did not seem to matter if the use of the trademark 
was distasteful—everything turned on whether its use was 
commercial.  Thus, L.L. Bean was much less concerned with the 
image that a trademark owner wanted to convey than with speech 
protection. 
While well-intentioned, the First Circuit’s analysis seemed to 
gloss over the fact that Drake’s parody was no less injurious to a 
brand image than the uses in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders or 
Milky Way Productions were, and it was somewhat at pains to 
distinguish those cases, which it believed were commercial uses, 
from L.L. Bean’s noncommercial editorial.107  The court thus did 
not clearly define what uses of a trademark would fall under the 
rubric of “noncommercial use” and left the determination up to 
subjective judicial assessments. 
2. Tarnishment Rationales Underlying San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee and MGM-
Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol 
Around roughly the same time as the L.L. Bean case, two cases 
involving the use of trademarks and sexuality were working their 
way through the courts.108  Although neither of these cases dealt 
explicitly with tarnishment or dilution, a tarnishment rationale 
underlies these cases—specifically, the tarnishment of marks by 
 
 106 Id. at 34. 
 107 Id. at 32–33. 
 108 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987); 
MGM-Pathe Commc’ns, Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
see also Int’l Olympic Comm. v. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 789 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 
1986) (denial from rehearing en banc).  
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association with homosexuality.109  While International Olympic 
Committee v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics (the “Gay Olympics 
case”) relied on the Amateur Sports Act to avoid a trademark’s 
association with a group of gay athletes,110 the court in MGM-
Pathe Communications, Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol111 allowed 
concerns about tarnishment to inform its likelihood of confusion 
analysis, thus enjoining a group committed to the prevention of 
violence against gay men and women from using the mark of their 
choice.112 
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit denied a rehearing en banc for the 
Gay Olympics case.113  The case involved a San Francisco non-
profit corporation that sought to use the name “Gay Olympics 
Games” for an event it wanted to sponsor that was “designed to 
combat homophobia and to work for the health and tolerance of 
gay and lesbian persons.”114  The United States Olympic 
Committee (the “USOC”) sued San Francisco Arts & Athletics 
(the “SFAA”) under a federal statute that gave the USOC “the 
exclusive right to use the word Olympic ‘for the purpose of trade, 
to induce the sale of any goods or service, or to promote any 
theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition.’”115  
The Ninth Circuit held for the USOC and upheld an injunction 
against the SFAA’s use of “Gay Olympic Games.”116  Dissenting 
from the rehearing en banc, Judge Kozinski cautioned that the 
result reached by the court “threaten[ed] a potentially serious and 
widespread infringement of personal liberties.”117  The SFAA 
sought to use the term “Olympic” to evoke a positive and healthy 
 
 109 See Sonia Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan 
Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 462–63 (2006) (citing the Gay 
Olympics case as an example of how “courts have routinely protected the rights of 
intellectual property owners to enjoin expressive uses of their works under the argument 
that sexualized depictions ‘tarnish’ the wholesomeness of the original”).  
 110 See Kravitz, supra note 75, at 180 (suggesting that the Gay Olympics case turned on 
dilution more than any likelihood of confusion).  
 111 774 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  
 112 See id. at 876.  
 113 789 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1986) (denial from rehearing en banc). 
 114 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  
 115 Id. (quoting 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1982)).  
 116 Id.  
 117 Id.  
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image of gay men and women.118  According to Judge Kozinski, 
denying the SFAA the right to use the word “Olympic” deprived 
them of an essential “nuance of meaning:”119 
The word Olympic was no doubt chosen to foster a 
wholesome, normal image of homosexuals.  
Denying SFAA use of the word thwarts that 
purpose.  To say that the SFAA could have named 
its event “The Best and Most Accomplished 
Amateur Gay Athletes Competition” no more 
answers the [F]irst [A]mendment concerns here 
than to suggest that Paul Robert Cohen could have 
worn a jacket saying “I Strongly Resent the 
Draft.”120 
Criticizing the majority for treating “the word ‘Olympic’ and 
its associated symbols and slogans [as] essentially property,”121  
Judge Kozinski expressed concern for the strengthening of 
intellectual property rights at the expense of the public domain.122  
And then Judge Kozinski hit on the heart of the matter—the 
majority supported “an exclusion that is invoked pursuant to a 
subjective assessment of the wholesomeness of the proposed 
speaker or propriety of the proposed message.”123  Kozinski’s 
analysis thus indicates that the Ninth Circuit majority’s concerns 
were not grounded in any likelihood of confusion, but rather in the 
tarnishment of the Olympic name.  As Kozinski noted acerbically, 
the “handicapped, juniors, police, Explorers, even dogs are allowed 
to carry the Olympic torch, but homosexuals are not.”124 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 
1987.125  Relying on a Lockean conception of the USOC’s 
property right,126 the Court determined that the SFAA’s use of the 
term was commercial and could thus be reached by section 110 of 
 
 118 Id. at 1321.  
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 1323. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 528 (1987). 
 126 See id. at 532.  
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the Amateur Sports Act.127  Justice Powell’s majority opinion 
relied not on a likelihood of confusion analysis, but rather, on a 
dilution rationale:128  Congress “could determine that unauthorized 
uses [of the Olympic words and symbols], even if not confusing, 
nevertheless may harm the USOC by lessening the distinctiveness 
and thus the commercial value of the marks.”129 
In his dissent, Justice Brennan took the majority to task for 
upholding a statute that he maintained was unconstitutionally 
overbroad—it prohibited noncommercial uses that would have 
benefited from First Amendment protection had the Act 
incorporated any of the traditional trademark defenses codified in 
the Lanham Act.130  Indeed, the Act benefited from “additional 
authority to regulate a substantial amount of noncommercial 
speech that serves to promote social and political ideas.”131  
According to Justice Brennan, “this broad discretion creat[ed] the 
potential for significant suppression of protected speech.”132  
Furthermore, the Act was not viewpoint neutral—the “Amateur 
Sports Act singles out certain . . . groups for favorable treatment” 
but not others, including the SFAA.133  Similar to Judge Kozinki’s 
view, Justice Brennan’s dissent implied that the injunction on this 
use was predicated upon a homophobic tarnishment rationale. 
Thus, as Judge Kozinski and Justice Brennan indicated, the 
Gay Olympics cases, although not decided under the Lanham Act, 
had disturbing consequences for the association of sexual 
orientation and trademarks.  As Rosemary Coombe asserts, 
“Trademark legislation thus enabled a public authority to exercise 
 
 127 Id. at 539–41.  It is important to underscore that the statute at issue here was not the 
Lanham Act, but rather, the Amateur Sports Act, which granted greater rights to the use 
of the word “Olympic” than the Lanham Act would have.  Nonetheless, the court relied 
on trademark principles in its analysis, and the decision has had wide-reaching influence 
in trademark law. 
 128 Indeed, the Court emphasized that “the USOC need not prove that a contested use is 
likely to cause confusion, and an unauthorized user of the word does not have available 
the normal statutory defenses.” Id. at 531. 
 129 Id. at 539. 
 130 Id. at 562 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Statutory trademark defenses are codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1115 (2006). 
 131 S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 132 Id. at 568. 
 133 Id. at 570. 
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its power over a signifier in a discriminatory manner—to prevent 
subordination from becoming translated into hegemonic 
articulation.”134  This result was inherently problematic because 
“SFAA’s speech was speech on behalf of an unpopular minority, 
thus more susceptible to being discouraged.”135  Thus, the majority 
opinion in the Gay Olympics case prevented gay athletes from 
empowering themselves by using a word that evokes the “spirit of 
co-operation, mutual acceptance, and international friendship.”136  
Moreover, the Supreme Court had (inadvertently?) created 
precedent whereby a court could deem a trademark’s association 
with sexual orientation tarnishment, and it restricted the free 
speech rights of a marginalized group. 
A tarnishment rationale similarly underlies the Second 
Circuit’s decision in MGM-Pathe Communications, Co. v. Pink 
Panther Patrol.  The case involved a gay rights group’s use of the 
name “The Pink Panther Patrol.”137  The group patrolled the streets 
of New York, “with the goals of protecting the gay community and 
educating the general public about violence against gays.”138  The 
name it chose was a deliberate homage to “other activist 
organizations such as the Grey and Black Panthers, changed to 
pink because pink is a color associated with gay activism.”139  
MGM filed suit to protect its trademark in the movie and popular 
cartoon character of the same name,140 alleging trademark 
infringement and dilution under New York State’s General 
Business Law.141  Although Judge Leval142 granted a preliminary 
 
 134 COOMBE, supra note 23, at 137; see also Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and 
the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1, 60 (2008) (“The Olympic Committee should have no 
right to make decisions with respect to the cultural meaning of the Olympic Games and, 
particularly, on whether or not they should be associated with homosexuals.  By allowing 
the Olympic Committee to decide this issue, a single private entity is allowed to 
determine whether our cultural perception of wholesome and prestigious athletic games 
should include the notion of homosexuality.”). 
 135 Kravitz, supra note 75, at 177. 
 136 Dreyfuss, supra note 22, at 413. 
 137 MGM-Pathe Commc’ns, Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 871 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 872. 
 141 Id. 
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injunction on the basis of likelihood of confusion, stating that he 
did not need to consider MGM’s state dilution claim,143 
tarnishment concerns pervade his opinion.144  Judge Leval 
underscored that “MGM uses its mark to promote an image of 
lighthearted, nonpolitical, asexual, amicable, comic entertainment” 
whereas “[t]he Patrol’s use of the name is associated with political 
activism, violence, defiance, homosexuality and angry 
confrontation.”145  Moreover, in weighing the balance of hardships, 
Judge Leval was concerned about 
the cheapening [of the Pink Panther mark] through 
repeated use by others and the likely alteration of 
the image associated with the mark that could result 
from publicity given to violent attacks and 
counterattacks involving the Pink Panther Patrol 
[that] could seriously impair the value and 
continued usefulness of [MGM’s] mark.146 
Pink Panther Patrol is thus another example of sexual 
orientation as a tarnishing agent. While Judge Leval’s analysis 
ostensibly focuses on likelihood of confusion, it is far from clear 
that confusion could have resulted from the gay rights group’s use 
of the mark.  Indeed, while the marks were the same, the lack of 
proximity of the marks in the marketplace and similar marketing 
channels strongly indicated that confusion would not result; 
moreover, there was no evidence of actual confusion.147  Rather, 
dilution by tarnishment seemed to be foremost on Judge Leval’s 
mind. 
 
 142 The fact that Judge Leval, champion of free speech and fair use, decided this case is 
more than a little ironic. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (examining copyright fair use); Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: 
Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187 (2004) [hereinafter Leval, 
Trademark]. 
 143 Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. at 877. 
 144 See Burstein, supra note 40, at 1203 (“One court hinted—although it did not 
consider or decide—that tarnishment might be found where a defendant’s use of a 
famous mark links the senior user’s mark to a contentious political issue where the senior 
user ‘has developed [the] mark to suggest ‘carefree, comedic, non-political fun.’’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. at 871–73)).  
 145 Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. at 876 (emphasis added). 
 146 Id. at 877. 
 147 See id. at 874–76. 
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Pink Panther Patrol, like the Gay Olympics case, added more 
fuel to the fire of tarnishment by association with “gayness,” 
notwithstanding the fact that sexual orientation is not synonymous 
with “unwholesomeness.”  While, as the succeeding sections 
demonstrate, courts became more solicitous of free speech 
concerns in tarnishment cases, this tarnishment-by-sexuality 
rationale eventually found a place in pre-litigation maneuvers by 
trademark holders, namely in cease-and-desist letters. 
3. Tarnishment Cases Under the FTDA 
Following the enactment of the FTDA in 1995, statutory 
exemptions and judicial interpretation arguably began to afford 
greater protection to sexually connotative uses of marks. In 
particular, because the FTDA granted an exemption for 
noncommercial uses,148 tarnishment could not reach certain kinds 
of speech.  While some courts continued to rely on pre-FTDA case 
law in attempting to define tarnishing uses,149 the dividing line 
between actionable and non-actionable uses moved away from the 
content of the use to a consideration of whether it was commercial 
or noncommercial. 
A series of cases in the Ninth Circuit and its district courts 
began to solidify this distinction in the context of sexually explicit 
or suggestive uses of marks.  For example, in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. 
Media Market Group, Ltd.,150 the Northern District of California 
relied on the district court’s opinion in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA 
Records, Inc.151 in holding that a “pornographic animated film 
entitled ‘Starballz’” was not actionable tarnishment under the 
FTDA.152  Lucasfilm had sought a preliminary injunction alleging 
 
 148 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996), 
repealed by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 
730. 
 149 See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 
1996) (“Some cases have found that a mark is tarnished when its likeness is placed in the 
context of sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal activity.”); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. 
New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733 (D. Minn. 1998) (“[T]arnishment most 
frequently occurs when a mark is used in connection with sexually explicit materials . . . 
.”).  
 150 182 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 151 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1998).  
 152 Media Mkt. Group, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 899–901. 
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that the film infringed and diluted its trademarks in “Star Wars.”153  
In rejecting Lucasfilm’s claims, the court emphasized that 
“[p]arody is a form of non-commercial, protected speech which is 
not affected by the [FTDA].”154  While the court’s conclusory 
statement on parody lacked nuance somewhat,155 the court seemed 
to be emphasizing that an expressive use, though pornographic, 
will not rise to the level of actionable tarnishment.  The implication 
was that courts may enjoin pornographic uses only when they deem 
the use commercial.  Indeed, the court did agree that “Starballz 
tarnishes the Star Wars family of marks by associating them with a 
pornographic film that is inconsistent with the image Star Wars has 
striven to maintain for itself” but held that this use was simply not 
actionable under the FTDA.156 
Soon after Media Market Group was decided, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.157 came 
down.  Writing for the majority, Judge Kozinski held that the band 
Aqua’s use of Mattel’s “Barbie” mark in Aqua’s song and song 
title “Barbie Girl” fell under the FTDA’s noncommercial use 
exemption.158  Mattel had sued MCA records, Aqua’s label, for 
trademark infringement and dilution, alleging that the song harmed 
the “Barbie” mark.159  As Judge Kozinski pointed out, “the 
song . . . lampoons the Barbie image and comments humorously on 
the cultural values Aqua claims she represents.”160  While the song 
was not overtly explicit, sexual innuendos abounded.  To wit, the 
song contained the following lyrics that are at odds with the 
squeaky-clean image Mattel strives to maintain for Barbie: “You 
can brush my hair, undress me everywhere” and “Kiss me here, 
touch me there, hanky-panky.”161  Although the opinion did not 
 
 153 Id. at 899. 
 154 Id. at 900. 
 155 A full examination of the scope of parody is beyond this paper.  For more on the 
contours of trademark parody, see generally Cantwell, supra note 59; Bruce P. Keller & 
Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 
94 TRADEMARK REP. 979 (2004). 
 156 See Media Mkt. Group, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 900–01. 
 157 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 158 Id. at 906–07; see supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 159 Id. at 899. 
 160 Id. at 907. 
 161 Id. at 909 (app.).  
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explicitly mention “tarnishment,” it was clear that Mattel found the 
song to be offensive.  Judge Kozinski held, however, that because 
the song did not comprise fully commercial speech, it fell under 
the FTDA’s noncommercial use exemption.162  Thus, Judge 
Kozinski underscored that the inquiry should not focus on the 
offensiveness of the speech itself—rather, he focused on the 
commercial/noncommercial fulcrum.  Moreover, he arguably 
expanded the scope of this exemption.  As one commentator notes, 
Mattel thus modifies the dichotomy first proposed 
in Bean from commercial use versus expressive use 
to commercial speech versus noncommercial 
speech. Under this reading, “mixed” uses of a 
trademark (i.e., uses that combine a commercial 
with an expressive purpose) would not be 
actionable under the FTDA because they will 
always do more than “propose a commercial 
transaction.”163 
Thus, under MCA, it would seem that pornographic but 
expressive uses of a mark could arguably pass muster. 
The Ninth Circuit relied on MCA a year later in Mattel, Inc. v. 
Walking Mountain Productions.164  Mattel had brought suit against 
Thomas Forsythe, an artist who had created the “Food Chain 
Barbie” photo series, “in which he depicted Barbie in various 
absurd and often sexualized positions.”165  Indeed, Forsythe 
display[ed] carefully positioned, nude, and 
sometimes frazzled looking Barbies in often 
ridiculous and apparently dangerous situations. . . .  
In some of [his] photos Barbie is about to be 
destroyed or harmed by domestic life in the form of 
kitchen appliances, yet continues displaying her 
well-known smile, disturbingly oblivious to her 
predicament. . . .  [He] convey[ed] a sexualized 
 
 162 Id. at 906 (“If speech is not ‘purely commercial’—that is, if it does more than 
propose a commercial transaction—then it is entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.”).  
 163 Cantwell, supra note 59, at 577. 
 164 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 165 Id. at 796.  
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perspective of Barbie by showing the nude doll in 
sexually suggestive contexts.166 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the defendant on all claims, including 
copyright and trademark infringement and dilution.167  In its brief 
analysis of dilution, the court relied on MCA for the proposition 
that “[p]arody is a form of noncommercial expression if it does 
more than propose a commercial transaction.”168  The court 
deemed Forsythe’s works parodies, and thus the sexualized 
Barbies comprised noncommercial speech.169  As in MCA and 
Media Market Group, the court was not swayed by the fact that the 
content of Forsythe’s pieces was at odds with the image that Mattel 
sought to cultivate or that Mattel viewed the works as damaging to 
Barbie’s brand image. 
Thus, as Media Market Group, MCA, and Walking Mountain 
Productions all demonstrate, courts began to avoid a qualitative 
assessment of the speech in favor of a commercial/noncommercial 
distinction.170  Thus, speech that associated trademarks with 
sexually explicit or suggestive material arguably began to have 
more protection than under state dilution statutes.  At the same 
time, however, some courts continued to find tarnishment in 
perhaps nonexpressive uses of marks, particularly with respect to 
uses of trademarks in the domain names of pornographic 
websites.171  These decisions are not necessarily at odds with MCA, 
 
 166 Id. at 802. 
 167 Id. at 796. 
 168 Id. at 812. 
 169 Id. 
 170 But see Kraft Food Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 942, 956 (E.D. Ill. 2002) 
(holding that the defendant artist’s use of the nickname “King VelVeeda” on a website 
containing pornographic material and drug use would dilute the plaintiff’s “Velveeta” 
mark).  As Cantwell notes, the court there demonstrated “judicial priggishness” in 
refusing to consider application of the FTDA’s noncommercial use exception to this less-
than-tasteful use of the plaintiff’s mark. Cantwell, supra note 59, at 568–69.  
 171 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions, Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1620, 1627 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the use of “Barbie” mark in “barbiesplaypen.com” site 
tarnished Mattel’s mark); Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, No. Civ.A. H97-1855, 
1998 WL 110059, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 1998) (granting permanent injunction 
against use of the mark “Polo” in the name of defendant’s “adult entertainment 
establishment”); Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm’t Group Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1480 
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding that defendant’s use of the “Candy Land” mark in its 
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however, as they arguably involve purely commercial uses of the 
plaintiff’s trademarks. 
It is important to underscore that beyond the noncommercial 
exemption provided in the FTDA, other courts sought to tighten 
the evidentiary requirements for showing dilution.  Most 
prominently, in Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue,172 the Supreme 
Court held that the FTDA required “a showing of actual dilution, 
rather than a likelihood of dilution.”173  The Supreme Court 
refused to presume that the “Victoria’s Secret” mark would be 
diluted by a small store in Fort Knox, Kentucky named “Victor’s 
Little Secret” that sold sex toys and lingerie.174  It seems that the 
Supreme Court did not want to automatically equate what 
Victoria’s Secret described as “unwholesome, tawdry 
merchandise”175 with actionable dilution under the FTDA.  For that 
reason, it held that “actual dilution” was required under federal 
law.176  Although Congress overruled the decision in Moseley by 
enacting the Trademark Dilution Revision Act in 2006,177 the case 
still evinces an effort to reign in the potentially broad-reaching 
scope of tarnishment and dilution.178 
 
“sexually explicit Internet site, and [use of] the name string ‘www.candyland.com’ as an 
Internet domain name” diluted the plaintiff’s mark and granting a preliminary injunction).  
 172 537 U.S. 418 (2003), remanded to 558 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D. Ky. 2008), aff’d 605 
F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010).  
 173 Id. at 433. 
 174 Id. at 423. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 433. 
 177 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 109 Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1063–64, 1092, 1125, 1127 (2006)). 
178  On remand, however, the Moseley case took a decidedly different turn, seemingly 
reviving tarnishment in the courts by holding that the TDRA “creates a kind of rebuttable 
presumption, or at least a very strong inference, that a new mark used to sell sex related 
products is likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic association 
between the two.” V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 
2010); see also Matthew D. Marcotte, Dilution Back from the Dead? V Secret v. 
Moseley, Visa International v. JSL Corp., and National Pork Board v. Supreme Lobster 
and Seafood Co., 80 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 402 (2010) (arguing that 
there may be “a new glimmer of hope for dilution plaintiffs” in the wake of three recent 
decisions upholding a likelihood of dilution).  
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Thus, as this section has demonstrated, case law under the 
FTDA began treating tarnishment claims with greater solicitude for 
speech.179 
4. Post-TDRA Tarnishment and Sexually Suggestive 
Associations 
Since the enactment of the TDRA in 2006, very few cases 
involving tarnishment and sexuality have been adjudicated.  In 
Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,180 Carol Burnett 
sued Fox for copyright and trademark infringement, dilution, 
statutory right of publicity, and common law misappropriation 
over a Family Guy episode she deemed offensive.181  In the 
episode, “an animated figure resembling the ‘Charwoman’ from 
the Carol Burnett Show” was mopping the floor in a porn shop 
while a variation of Carol’s Theme from the Carol Burnett show 
played in the background.182  The brief Carol Burnett reference 
also featured a puerile sexual innuendo involving Carol Burnett’s 
father.183  The district court granted the motion to dismiss on all 
claims.184  In dismissing the dilution claim, the court held that the 
Family Guy episode was “artistic” and “parodic” noncommercial 
speech and thus it could not be the subject of a trademark dilution 
claim.185  The court did state that it “fully appreciate[d] how 
distasteful and offensive the segment [was] to Ms. Burnett,”186 but 
it ultimately maintained that “the law, as it must in an open society, 
provides broad protection for the defendant’s segment.”187  Thus, 
even though the court found Family Guy’s uses of Burnett’s 
 
 179 But see Cantwell, supra note 59, at 579 (“Yet it seems likely that post-Mattel case 
law will present no less of patchwork than the pre-Mattel case law.”).  
 180 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  
 181 Id. at 966. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See id. (“The scene switches back to Peter and his friends.  One of the friends 
remarks: ‘You know, when she tugged her ear at the end of that show, she was really 
saying goodnight to her mom.’  Another friend responds, ‘I wonder what she tugged to 
say goodnight to her dad,’ finishing with a comic’s explanation, ‘Oh!’” (internal citations 
omitted)).  
 184 Id. at 975. 
 185 Id. at 974. 
 186 Id.  
 187 Id. at 975. 
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trademarks to be distasteful, it maintained that it could not enjoin 
the use on those grounds alone.  Although the Burnett case does 
not involve overt references to sex and sexuality, it suggests that 
post-TDRA courts may continue the trend of broadly interpreting 
exemptions from the tarnishment cause of action in the Lanham 
Act.188 
5. Tarnishment in the Courts Redux: Where Do We Go from 
Here? 
As the foregoing sections demonstrate, the case law on 
tarnishment is a mixed bag, but it does indicate a growing 
 
188  It is worth noting, however, that the recent Sixth Circuit Moseley decision has 
created some cause for concern regarding the automatic linkage between tarnishment and 
sex/sexuality. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 387–88 (6th Cir. 
2010) (“There appears to be a clearly emerging consensus in the case law . . . that the 
creation of an ‘association’ between a famous mark and lewd or bawdy sexual activity 
disparages and defiles the famous mark and reduces the commercial value of its selling 
power.  This consensus stems from an economic prediction about consumer taste and 
how the predicted reaction of conventional consumers in our culture will affect the 
economic value of the famous mark.”); id. at 389 (“Thus, any new mark with a lewd or 
offensive-to-some sexual association raises a strong inference of tarnishment.  The 
inference must be overcome by evidence that rebuts the probability that some consumers 
will find the new mark both offensive and harmful to the reputation and the favorable 
symbolism of the famous mark.”); Paul Alan Levy, What Dilution by Tarnishment Is 
Really About, PUB. CITIZEN CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 20, 2010, 3:02 PM), 
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2010/05/what-dilution-by-tarnishment-is-really-
about.html (criticizing the outcome of the case and the disingenuity of its reasoning by 
noting that Victoria’s Secret’s “products are sexy lingerie and the like; and its real 
product is sexual connotation”—in sum, it is difficult to “tarnish” already sexed up 
goods); J. Thomas McCarthy, A First Look by Tom McCarthy at the Sixth Circuit’s 2010 
Victoria’s Secret Tarnishment Decision, ERIC GOLDMAN—TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG 
(May 24, 2010, 9:07 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/05/a_first_look 
_by.htm (“The decision also raises troubling issues of commercial speech.  The majority 
creates a presumption of dilution by tarnishment if the junior mark appears on ‘sex-
related products,’ invoking the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  This sounds like the 
court is making value judgments about what is ‘sexy.’  As dissenting [J]udge Moore 
points out, it’s ironic that the ‘tarnished’ plaintiff’s VICTORIA’S SECRET mark itself is 
widely promoted as a source for ‘sexy little things’ intimate lingerie.”).  Further exegesis 
on the Moseley decision is beyond the scope of this Note; it is important, though, to 
underscore its possible implications for tarnishment law, even though it is arguably 
premised on a misunderstanding of tarnishment and the recent trends in case law.  At the 
same time, Moseley may be distinguished from noncommercial speech cases because of 
the defendants’ use of their mark as a source signifier and the commercial nature of their 
use (for an adult-themed store offering sex toys and other sexually-themed objects). 
Moseley, 605 F.3d at 384. 
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solicitude for broadly interpreting the federal statute to exempt 
many, if not all, types of expressive speech.  As Professor 
McGeveran notes, “the results of reported cases involving 
expressive uses . . . have stabilized in the last decade and now 
favor the expressive uses most of the time.”189 
At the same time, dilution law in general seems to be becoming 
less successful in the courts and “[j]udicial enthusiasm for dilution 
as a theory of infringement has diminished.”190 As Professor Long 
notes, 
Judicial enforcement of dilution law is not robust 
today and has been eroding over time. . . .  [R]elief 
rates have been on a downward trajectory since 
then.  It could well be the case that dilution law is a 
powerful bargaining chip in cease-and-desist letters 
and in negotiations entirely outside the litigatory 
arena.  In the federal courts, however, dilution cases 
are not exactly a juggernaut.  That is not to say that 
dilution law lacks seductive appeal, but rather that 
is seems not to have worked its wiles on the judicial 
mind as many feared.191 
Long’s research demonstrates that, under FTDA reported 
cases, “the rate at which trademark holders have been able to get 
injunctive relief on their dilution claims in district court has been 
dropping over time from an initial success rate of 54.17% in 1996 
to 12.00% for the first half of 2005.”192  Similarly, in unreported 
filings, relief rates dropped from 45.45% in 1999 to 14.81% in the 
first half of 2005.193  Professor Barton Beebe further argues that 
there is “strong and disturbing evidence of the continuing debacle 
of U.S. antidilution law and of the failure of the TDRA so far to 
effect any substantial change in course.”194  Moreover, “the case 
 
 189 McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 59.  Professor McGeveran defines 
“expressive uses” as those “uses of trademarks [that] convey an articulable message 
rather than, or in addition to, the traditional function of source identification.” Id. at 54. 
 190 Long, supra note 28, at 1054. 
 191 Id. at 1031.  
 192 Id. at 1042 (including domain name cases). 
 193 Id. at 1050 (including domain name cases). 
 194 Beebe, supra note 30, at 450. 
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law shows the remarkable extent to which courts continue to treat 
the dilution cause of action as redundant of—and, thus, made 
superfluous by—the infringement cause of action.”195 
At first blush, it would seem that dilution in general, and 
tarnishment in particular, is losing its salience in trademark law.  
However, as Part II will demonstrate, it is likely that dilution by 
tarnishment plays an increasing role in pre-litigation 
correspondence, namely cease-and-desist letters.  Moreover, the 
early attitudes towards uses of trademarks in either sexually 
explicit contexts or with reference to sexual orientation still seem 
to inform trademark owners’ actions in the cease-and-desist 
context. 
II. BRANDS AS VEHICLES OF SPEECH: HOW CEASE-AND-DESIST 
LETTERS MAY CHILL DEPICTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS OF SEXUALITY 
As Part I discussed, tarnishment’s scope in adjudications has 
largely been cabined by statutory provisions and judicial fiat.  As 
this Part will suggest, tarnishment allegations still can thrive in the 
plethora of cease-and-desist letters that mark owners send on a 
routine basis.  This Part will begin by emphasizing the distinction 
between sex and sexuality in trademark recodings.  It will also 
briefly survey the examples of cease-and-desist letters that 
potential trademark recoders196 and parodists have received.  It will 
then examine how cease-and-desist letters chill speech and 
examine why this silencing is troublesome.  This Part will further 
examine how, notwithstanding, First Amendment,197 statutory (the 
 
 195 Id.  In Beebe’s survey of cases decided since the effective date of the TDRA on 
October 6, 2006, he found “that of the twenty-six opinions that found no infringement, 
none found dilution.  Of the fifteen opinions that found infringement, fourteen also found 
dilution, yet none of these fourteen findings of dilution resulted in remedies not already 
triggered by the court’s finding of infringement.” Id. at 450–51. 
 196 According to Rosemary Coombe, recoding is “productive activity in which people 
engage in meaning-making to adapt signs, texts, and images to their own agendas.” 
COOMBE, supra note 23, at 57. 
 197 While I use the First Amendment here as shorthand for speech considerations, it is 
important to underscore that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is well-embedded in 
trademark law.  As Professor McGeveran notes, it would be undesirable to “invite First 
Amendment balancing into the workaday functioning of trademark cases” because 
“judges should avoid unnecessary constitutional decision-making.” William McGeveran, 
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TDRA exemptions), and case law (the commercial/ 
noncommercial distinctions drawn by courts) protections, these 
doctrines do not provide adequate safeguards for recoders.  In the 
context of speech referencing sexuality and sexual orientation, a 
main concern is the silencing of a minority group’s views through 
the functional equivalent of a prior restraint on speech.  For uses of 
a trademark in a sexually explicit setting, this is also a concern, as 
these uses are never formally deemed obscene under current legal 
standards.  Moreover, this Part will also touch on the practical 
implications for the average individual receiving a cease-and-desist 
letter. 
A. Distinctions Between “Sex” and “Sexuality” in Disputed 
Trademark Uses 
Before this Note embarks on a more detailed examination of 
recent cease-and-desist recipients, it is important to underscore, in 
light of the decisions surveyed in Part I supra, that there is a 
distinction between sexually explicit depictions of trademarks and 
those that reference sexuality and sexual orientation.  On the one 
hand, sexually explicit depictions include those that are obscene, 
pornographic, prurient, or sexually suggestive in nature, such as in 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, L.L. Bean, and Milky Way 
Productions.198  These depictions, while tacky and distasteful 
(depending on whom you ask), should generally be protected under 
the TDRA and existing tarnishment precedent if they fall under 
MCA’s rubric of “noncommercial.”199  At the same time, speech 
issues aside, one cannot entirely fault trademark owners for being 
concerned about associations with sexually explicit content,200 
 
Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 1205, 1212 (2008) [hereinafter McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals].   
 198 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 199 See, e.g., Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 
2007) (“A dilution action only applies to purely commercial speech.” (citing Mattel, Inc. 
v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
 200 See K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking 
Confusion Doctrine—Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and 
Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 634 (2004) (“Although trademark law 
should generally not chill artistic expression, it should prevent free-riding and egregious 
tarnishment (such as pornographic use) when the trademark holder’s reputation will 
suffer tangible harm.  For example, in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader Inc. v. Pussy Cinema 
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especially if the marks are child-oriented.201  Indeed, in examining 
recoding in copyright and trademark law, Professor Justin Hughes 
sees a distinction between trademarks that are “adult” by nature as 
opposed to those that are child-oriented: 
A further distinction might be drawn between, on 
the one hand, lewd recodings of Mickey Mouse and, 
on the other hand, the breast-exposed 
excheerleaders of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders 
parody poster.  After all, the Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders have always traded on sex—that is 
what their appeal is supposed to be.  Any Dallas 
Cowboys corporate-speak about the Cheerleaders 
maintaining an image of purity would surely be 
tongue-in-cheek capitalism. When some of the 
Cheerleader alumni are seen topless, it really does 
not seem to “contaminate” the existing cultural 
object much.  Mickey Mouse shooting up heroin 
puts a lot more stress on our communal image of 
Mickey Mouse than seeing a Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleader topless puts on our communal image of 
the Cheerleaders.202 
Thus, it would seem that potential degradation of more 
“wholesome” marks is arguably more objectionable or offensive. 
On the other hand, when groups like the Courage Campaign 
and SFAA seek to use marks in expressive ways, they are 
associating marks with sexual orientation, not sex per se.203  These 
 
Ltd., a pornographic filmmaker’s expressive right to use of Dallas Cowboy-style 
cheerleader outfits in a film was found to be outweighed by the trademark owner’s rights 
to the wholesome image of the cheerleaders.”).  
 201 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing sexually explicit Harry Potter fan fiction).  
 202 Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience 
Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 985 (1999) (footnote omitted) (referencing Walt Disney 
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. 
Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 394 n.4 (6th Cir. 2010) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Nor can the 
court ignore the character of the senior mark when applying the majority’s ‘rule.’  
Victoria’s Secret sells women’s lingerie, and, as Victoria’s Secret readily admits, its own 
mark is already associated with sex, albeit not with sex novelties.”); Levy, supra note 188 
(discussing the irony of the Moseley majority opinion). 
 203 See supra Part I. 
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uses are not prurient in nature—rather, they seek to express core 
identity.204  Decisions like Gay Olympics and Pink Panther Patrol, 
however, have seemingly conflated “sexual orientation” with 
unwholesomeness or unseemliness.205  This is inherently 
problematic, because, Part II.C demonstrates, there is a lot at stake 
in this arena.206  When such recoders receive cease-and-desist 
letters, they may capitulate and self-censor their speech, even when 
it is legally unobjectionable. 
B. Colorful Illustrations of the Cease-and-Desist Conundrum 
Justin Watt and the Courage Campaign, our protagonists from 
the introduction, are certainly not alone in their struggles with 
trademark owners less than amused by reinterpretations of their 
marks.  The following are anecdotes of expressions of sexuality or 
sexually connotative uses that trademark owners have sought to 
silence. 
1. Archie Grows Up, Comes Out, and Archie Comics Doesn’t 
Like It 
In April 2003, an Atlanta-based theatre group, Dad’s Garage 
Theatre, received a cease-and-desist letter claiming that the play it 
was about to open, “Archie’s Weird Fantasy,” infringed on the 
copyrights and trademarks Archie Comics held in its characters.207  
The play portrayed Archie and his pals “growing up, coming out 
and facing censorship.”208  According to the play’s artistic director, 
Sean Daniels, “Archie Comics thought if Archie was portrayed as 
being gay, that would dilute and tarnish his image.”209  The letter 
further pointed out seven alleged copyright infringements in the 
script that would each cost $150,000 in damages.210  Concerned 
that the play would not qualify under a parody exception to federal 
 
 204 See infra Part II.C. 
 205 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 206 See infra Part II.C. 
 207 Curt Holman, Fallen Archies: Dad’s Garage Told to Cease and Desist Archie 
Satire, CREATIVE LOAFING (Apr. 9, 2003), http://atlanta.creativeloafing.com/gyrobase/ 
Content?oid=oid:11826.  
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
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copyright and trademark law, Daniels decided to change the title of 
the play to “Weird Comic Book Fantasy.”211  However, the play’s 
author, Roberto Aguirre-Sacasa, apparently did not cede further 
ground to Archie Comics, and his tenacity paid off—in 2005, the 
play, re-dubbed “The Golden Age” premiered on a New York 
stage and garnered a favorable New York Times review.212 
As this example illustrates, this referencing of the Archie 
characters had no salacious content nor any malicious intent. 
Rather, it was one author’s recoding of cultural icons.  Archie 
Comics took exception to this recoding not because of any 
confusion-based rationale, but rather on the grounds that a gay 
reinvention of Archie would ruin the comic book character’s 
cherished (heterosexual) image.  Had Archie Comics succeeded in 
suppressing this speech, though, it would have done so on perhaps 
purely erroneous dilution grounds—the use clearly would have 
fallen under MCA’s rubric of noncommercial speech, as it does 
much more than propose a commercial transaction.  It would thus 
qualify for a statutory exemption under dilution law.213 
2. DC Comics Puts a Damper on Batman and Robin’s 
Relationship 
DC Comics, owner of the trademark rights to Batman and 
Robin, was not amused when it discovered artist Mark 
Chamberlain’s conceptualization of Batman and Robin’s 
relationship in August of 2005.214  Chamberlain’s paintings 
showed Batman and Robin in various stages of undress and in 
amorous embraces.215  DC Comics sent a cease-and-desist letter to 
the owner of the gallery where the works were on display.216  Not 
 
 211 Comic Book Legends Revealed #192, CBR, http://goodcomics.comicbookresources. 
com/2009/01/29/comic-book-legends-revealed-192 (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).  
 212 Id.; see also Neil Genzlinger, A Family Just Like Archie, Jughead and Their Pals, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2005, at B15, available at http://theater.nytimes.com/2005/ 
04/09/theater/reviews/09krai.html?_r=2&scp=2&sq=archie%20jughead&st=cse. 
 213 See supra note 57 and accompanying text; Part I.B.3–4. 
 214 See Gallery Told to Drop “Gay” Batman, BBC NEWS, Aug. 19, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4167032.stm.  
 215 To access images of these paintings, see Mark Chamberlain, ARTNET, http://www. 
artnet.com/artist/424157172/mark-chamberlain.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).  
 216 Artnet News, ARTNET (Aug. 18, 2005), http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/ 
news/artnetnews/artnetnews8-18-05.asp.  
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only did it seek to stop the exhibition, it also demanded that the 
owner of the gallery “hand over all unsold work.”217  It is very 
likely that DC Comics was not just asserting its trademark and 
copyright rights in sending the letter; tarnishment of Batman’s 
virile heterosexual image was no doubt at issue here.  As the 
images are still available on Artnet’s site,218 it seems that 
Chamberlain did not fully accede to DC Comics’ demands.  
Nonetheless, this example is distressing because DC Comics not 
only sought to prevent public display of Chamberlain’s artistic 
speech, it also sought to confiscate the artist’s physical property.  
Most importantly, the trademark basis for those asserted rights was 
weak at best because Chamberlain had used the iconic characters 
in an expressive work that was not purely, if at all, commercial. 
3. Honorable Mention: Other Cease-and-Desist Tarnishment 
Highlights 
Another notable example of cease-and-desist “‘gorilla-chest 
thumping’”219 occurred in 2008 when counsel for the United States 
Olympic Committee sent a letter to a gay mens group, the 
“Northwest Bears,” who had used the name Kamp Kodiak 2008 
“Olympic Village” for its annual summer campout.220  As noted in 
USOC’s letter, the Amateur Sports Act allows the Olympic 
Committee to preempt any commercial uses of its mark that it has 
not licensed.221  The Northwest Bears event, however, was a 
noncommercial, not-for-profit gathering,222 which, even under the 
Gay Olympics case, might not have fallen under the Amateur 
 
 217 Gallery Told to Drop “Gay” Batman, supra note 214.  
 218 See Mark Chamberlain, supra note 215.  
 219 McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 64 (quoting Frequently Asked Questions, 
CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org/question.cgi? 
QuestionID=250 (last visited Apr. 19, 2010)).  
 220 Meegbear, U.S. Olympic Committee Targets the Northwest’s Large, Hairy Gay Men, 
DEMOCRATIC UNDERGROUND.COM (July 24, 2008, 8:20 AM), http://www.democratic 
underground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=221x80234 (displaying 
correspondence with Carol Gross from the United States Olympic Committee).  
 221 Id.; see 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2006).  
 222 Meegbear, supra note 220. 
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Sports Act’s prohibitions.223  Nonetheless, the Northwest Bears 
capitulated, though one member noted that he was from the 
Olympic Peninsula of Washington State and many organizations 
from his home region used the term “Olympic.”224  Thus, USOC 
succeeded in silencing speech that was noncommercial and 
referenced not only the Olympic Games, but also the Northwest 
Bears’ geographic home. 
Cease-and-desist letters are also common in the fan fiction 
arena.225  Fan fiction involves the “widespread and active 
appropriation of given texts, plots, and characters” in which fans 
“recontextualize” and expand upon films, TV shows, and 
fiction.226  Often these recontextualizations involve “graphic sexual 
activity.”227  Fan fiction works, while often posted on the Internet, 
are not written for profit,228 but the fact that they have no 
pecuniary benefit has not stopped trademark and copyright holders 
from objecting, often on tarnishment grounds.229  The Chilling 
Effects Clearinghouse features one such cease-and-desist letter 
sent to a Harry Potter fan fiction writer.230  The letter, sent by J.K. 
Rowling’s attorneys in London, expresses concern over the 
“integrity” of Rowling’s intellectual property rights in Harry Potter 
and scolds the recipient for making such “sexually explicit” 
 
 223 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.15 
(1987) (“[T]he extent to which the Act may be read to apply to noncommercial speech is 
limited.”). 
 224 Meegbear, supra note 220.  
 225 A detailed analysis of the legal and sociological intricacies of fan fiction are beyond 
the scope of this paper.  For a more detailed analysis, see generally COOMBE, supra note 
23, at 117–29; Katyal, supra note 109; Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a 
New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997).  
 226 Katyal, supra note 109, at 483. 
 227 See id. at 483–89 (describing “slash” fiction).  
 228 See COOMBE, supra note 23, at 118. 
 229 See Christopher Noxon, When Harry Met Smutty, METRO (June 26–July 2, 2003), 
http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/06.26.03/potter-0326.html.  Furthermore, 
Professor Sonia Katyal highlights that in the slash fan fiction cease-and-desist arena, 
where content involves same-sex relationships, another difficulty that arises is that “it is 
hard to separate out whether the objectionable content is considered to be problematic 
because of its graphic sexual content or because of the same-sex narrative that it offers.” 
Katyal, supra note 109, at 513. 
 230 See Harry Potter Adult Fan Fiction, CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic/notice.cgi?NoticeID=534 (last visited Apr. 19, 
2010).  
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material available for all to see on his website.  While Rowling’s 
counsel deems the work “sexually explicit,” it is important to note 
that there was no judicial determination that it was obscene, nor 
that it was done for a purely commercial purpose.  Rather, Rowling 
seems to be the ultimate arbiter here in what is legally 
objectionable in the fan fiction work. 
C. Why the Stakes Are High in Cease-and-Desist Scenarios 
The stakes are high for people seeking to recode, parody, or 
simply reference parts of marks in noncommercial speech.  If they 
do not cease their allegedly infringing/diluting behavior, they risk 
an extended court battle.  And if they accede to the demands of the 
mark holder, they allow speech to be chilled, “even when the 
complained-of expressive uses are almost certainly legal under the 
substance of current legal doctrine.”231  As Professor McGeveran 
emphasizes, “Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
real action occurs outside the courthouse: markholders send cease-
and-desist letters and threaten legal action against those using 
trademarks to facilitate speech, and the recipients frequently 
capitulate.”232  Admittedly, it is difficult to calculate the ratio of 
speech silenced to cease-and-desist letters sent each year.233  
Scholars, however, agree that fear of litigation is a formidable 
chilling agent against speech.234  This is problematic in several 
major ways: one, speech is chilled for marginalized groups who 
seek to use trademarks in expressive ways; two, existing 
constitutional, statutory, and judge-made safeguards are too 
malleable and unpredictable to protect recoders ex ante; and three, 
cease-and-desist letters act as a form of prior restraint that restricts 
speech before it can even get to the courthouse. 
 
 231 McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 64. 
 232 McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals, supra note 197, at 1206–07; see also Beebe, 
supra note 30, at 458 n.36. 
 233 See William E. Ridgway, Note, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse, 21 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1547, 1577 (2006) (noting that an accurate assessment of all cease-
and-desist claims is difficult, as individuals “likely [to] know their legal rights better than 
the average internet user” are the ones posting cease-and-desist letters to the Chilling 
Effects Clearinghouse).  
 234 See, e.g., McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 52; Ramsay, supra note 29, at 
405. 
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1. How Cease-and-Desist Letters Silence Marginalized 
Recoders 
One concern regarding the increasing pervasiveness of cease-
and-desist letters, especially in the context of marks referencing 
sexual orientation, is the ability to silence marginalized groups.  As 
Rosemary Coombe expresses, individuals use trademark logos and 
other media imagery to “creat[e] new meanings for [the 
trademarks] by putting them in new contexts or juxtaposing them 
with other texts that convey[] hidden subtexts.”235  This is 
important, sociologically speaking, because individuals in our 
society benefit from a dialogic relationship with culture.236  
Coombe emphasizes: 
If what is quintessentially human is the capacity to 
make meaning, challenge meaning, and transform 
meaning, then we strip ourselves of our humanity 
through overzealous application and continuous 
expansion of intellectual property protections.  
Dialogue involves reciprocity in communication: 
the ability to respond to a sign with signs.  What 
meaning does dialogue have when we are 
bombarded with messages to which we cannot 
respond, signs and images whose significations 
cannot be challenged, and connotations we cannot 
contest?237 
Marginalized groups use trademarks expressively to engage in 
this dialogue and “in their struggles for recognition and voice.”238  
As the discussion supra Part I of the Gay Olympics case and Pink 
Panther Patrol indicates,239 the defendants in those cases sought to 
use the trademarks at issue to empower gay men and women and to 
challenge their status as a marginalized group.  SFAA and the Pink 
Panther Patrol both sought to use language to invoke positive 
images of themselves.  Allowing tarnishment rationales to block 
such uses contravened basic First Amendment principles: “This 
 
 235 COOMBE, supra note 23, at 73.  
 236 See id. at 82–87. 
 237 Id. at 84–85. 
 238 Id. at 130. 
 239 See supra Part I.B.2. 
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type of political advocacy on behalf of an unpopular minority has 
long been at the core of the [F]irst [A]mendment’s protections.”240  
Groups like SFAA and the Courage Campaign are asserting 
important political views implicating individual rights and 
liberties; as such, trademark law should not unduly censor such 
speech.  Indeed, it seems perverse that a brand image would take 
priority over a group’s desire and need to express itself and to 
engage in political speech. 
Even worse, in the cease-and-desist context, such speech often 
never gets to the point of formal adjudication.  Even though the 
examples illustrated above of Justin Watt, the Courage Campaign, 
and “Archie’s Weird Fantasy” indicate that speakers sometimes do 
fight back against trademark owners, these examples are the 
outliers.  This is because speakers lack the legal know-how and 
funds to pursue their claims more fully.241  A more likely scenario 
is that of the Northwest Bears, who simply sought to use the word 
“Olympic” as the name for an annual not-for-profit social 
gathering; they were firmly rebuked for doing so and then 
capitulated to the USOC’s demands.242  Given the pervasiveness of 
cease-and-desist letters, it is likely that those who seek to imbue 
brands with their own interpretations in art, music, literature, and 
film may simply not do so for fear of an imminent cease-and-desist 
letter. 
2. Malleable Doctrinal Safeguards Create Uncertainty 
As this Note has examined supra Part I, case law has become 
increasingly more favorable to defendants in tarnishment causes of 
action.243  At the same time, the doctrinal, statutory, and 
constitutional protections that defendants may rely on are, 
 
 240 Kravitz, supra note 75, at 179. 
 241 See infra Part II.B.3. 
 242 See supra Part II.A.3.  
 243 See supra Part I.B.  In 2010, however, it seems that dilution law, including 
tarnishment, may be enjoying a resurgence in the courts. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010); supra notes 178, 188.  
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nonetheless, often malleable and unpredictable.244  As a result, 
would-be defendants may become risk-averse and self-censor.245 
Take parody.  Parody is ostensibly protected under the 
TRDA.246  But ever since Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.’s247 
distinction between parody and satire,248 what constitutes parody 
has been the subject of much debate.249  As Bruce Keller and 
Rebecca Tushnet note, “‘parody’ is just as subject to manipulation 
by clever parties or courts in trademark as in copyright.”250  
Indeed, often the successfulness of the parody turns on whether the 
judge and jury get the joke,251 which can depend on certain socio-
economic and/or cultural differences between judges and 
recoders.252  Such contingencies do not offer strong assurances to 
the recipient of a cease-and-desist letter that her use is a protected 
one. 
Furthermore, the language of the TDRA’s exemptions itself 
does not provide protections on which would-be recoders can 
 
 244 This section briefly examines problems with the “protections” of the TDRA; it does 
not purport to exhaust the subject.  
 245 See McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 111. 
 246 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006). 
 247 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  Although Campbell is a copyright case, it has become 
common for courts to use its parody guidelines in trademark disputes. See, e.g., Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 248 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81 (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its 
point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) 
imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for 
the very act of borrowing.”).  
 249 See, e.g., Keller & Tushnet, supra note 155, at 979 (“[T]he distinction between 
parody and satire is too fine for courts (not generally recognized as great connoisseurs of 
humor) to make.”); id. at 990 (“[T]he distinction between parody and satire is in the eye 
of the presiding judge.”).  
 250 Id. at 1002–03. 
 251 See, e.g., Gulasekaram, supra note 95, at 911. 
 252 See Assaf, supra note 134, at 70 (“As the cases above show, it is hard to predict 
which expressions will be protected as parodies and which will be regarded as a pointless 
tarnishment.  Apart from legal uncertainty, this issue also has anti-democratic effects on 
cultural discourse.  The reason why some expressions do not amuse certain judges—but 
seem vulgar, tasteless or depraved to them—is that the judges belong to a different social 
group than the target audience of such expressions.  Courts exert what Pierre Bourdieu 
calls ‘symbolic violence’ by privileging the speech that appeals to them.  Judges, 
belonging to the cultural elite, silence the voices of other classes by condemning their 
aesthetic judgments.” (footnote omitted)). 
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comfortably rely.  The TDRA “needlessly muddies the law’s 
clarity” 253 by only exempting uses “‘other than as a designation of 
source.’”254  Like parody, this standard is subject to manipulation 
by parties and judges.  For example, in the parody at issue in the 
Courage Campaign’s dispute with ProtectMarriage.com, 
ProtectMarriage.com would argue that the Courage Campaign used 
the altered ProtectMarriage logo as a trademark to denote source, 
and thus its use could not be protected under the TDRA’s parody 
exemption.  The Courage Campaign, in turn, would argue that the 
use at issue was not a designation of source; rather, it was a 
deliberate political message completely unrelated to commercial 
concerns.  While the Courage Campaign could have a solid 
argument, once again, the interpretation of this provision is too 
unpredictable to afford much certainty, even for the most 
sophisticated of parties. 
An overarching concern when considering the malleability of 
doctrinal protections is that the exemptions rely on judges’ and 
juries’ sensibilities and their notions of propriety.  As Professor 
Ramsay underscores 
If the plaintiff’s mark is a well-known brand and the 
defendant is sleazy or the message incorporating the 
mark is distasteful, the judge or jury may rule for 
the plaintiff despite its speech-harmful trademark 
claims.  For example, courts punished and enjoined 
further use of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader’s 
trademarked outfits in a pornographic film and use 
of the Coca-Cola marks and logos in a poster with 
the phrase “Enjoy Cocaine.”  A fact-finder may 
deem a certain trademark distinctive or a certain use 
of a trademark confusing, diluting, or commercial 
because he or she dislikes the defendant or its 
expression.255 
Thus, inevitably, standards like these “invite judges and juries 
to evaluate the content of the speech, and . . . the vagueness of the 
 
 253 McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 107. 
 254 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006)).  
 255 Ramsay, supra note 29, at 449.   
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rules may cause even well-intentioned factfinders to be 
subconsciously swayed by the viewpoint and subject matter of the 
speech.”256  Moreover, the case law, while increasingly more 
favorable to expressive uses of all stripes, still evinces 
contradictions regarding what uses are legally objectionable and 
what are not.257  Ultimately, one must ask what good 
constitutional, statutory, and case law protections are when they 
are dependent, above all, on subjective notions of propriety and 
personal taste. 
3. Cease-and-Desists: A Private Action Prior Restraint? 
It is clear, then, that the threat of a looming cease-and-desist 
letter often chills speech and that existing doctrinal protections do 
not lessen this chilling effect.  From a legal perspective, this 
chilling effect is especially problematic because a cease-and-desist 
letter acts as the private action equivalent of a prior restraint.  
Under established First Amendment jurisprudence, prior restraints 
are disfavored by judges and are presumptively invalid.258 
A comparison of cease-and-desist letters and preliminary 
injunctions is instructive in this context.  In examining the 
problematic relationship between preliminary injunctions in 
intellectual property cases and prior restraints, Professors Mark 
Lemley and Eugene Volokh emphasize that “preliminary 
injunctions restraining speech are generally considered 
unconstitutional ‘prior restraints.’”259  They further note that 
although libel and obscenity law are “constitutionally valid 
restrictions on speech . . . courts refuse to allow preliminary 
injunctions there.”260  This is because courts must make a final 
determination as to whether allegedly libelous or obscene speech is 
 
 256 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After 
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 710 (2003).  Volokh argues 
that intellectual property rules are thus content-based, and should be treated as such. Id. 
 257 See Gulasekaram, supra note 95, at 914 (comparing the outcomes in L.L. Bean, 
Milky Way Productions, and Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders).  
 258 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).  
 259 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 169 (1998). 
 260 Id. at 150. 
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constitutionally protected.261  Lemley and Volokh then question 
the propriety of allowing such restraints in intellectual property 
cases.  For example, in the trademark context, plaintiffs may obtain 
preliminary injunctions before a “court can make a full 
determination on the merits that the speech is infringing.”262  
While Lemley and Volokh generally maintain that prior restraints 
against commercial speech that will likely lead to consumer 
confusion are appropriate, they caution that “a preliminary 
injunction against [noncommercial] speech seems to . . . be an 
unlawful prior restraint.”263  They emphasize that “[o]ne certainly 
couldn’t get a preliminary injunction against the publication of a 
book on the grounds that the contents of the book might eventually 
be demonstrated at trial to be false or even libelous and therefore 
constitutionally unprotected.”264  Similarly, trademark cases are 
“highly fact-specific [in] nature,” which highlights the importance 
of a full trial on the merits of the case.265  Courts simply do not 
provide this level of inquiry at the preliminary injunction phase.  
Thus, Lemley and Volokh’s analysis underscores that allowing 
prior restraints in the form of preliminary injunctions in dilution 
cases is incongruous with the greater solicitude that courts give to 
speech in libel and obscenity cases. 
By extension, the restraints that cease-and-desist letters place 
on speech are even more concerning especially when “the 
complained-of expressive uses are almost certainly legal under the 
substance of current legal doctrine.”266  With cease-and-desist 
letters, there are no substantive or procedural protections at all 
whatsoever, unlike in a judicial determination for a preliminary 
injunction, where a court must generally determine “(1) a 
combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility 
of irreparable harm, or (2) that there exist serious questions 
regarding the merits and the balance of hardships that tip in 
 
 261 See id. at 180. 
 262 Id. at 222.  
 263 Id. at 224. 
 264 Id. at 222. 
 265 Id. 
 266 McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 64. 
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[plaintiff’s] favor.”267  Thus, even judicial determinations of 
preliminary injunctions, themselves inherently problematic as prior 
restraints, afford more speech protection than cease-and-desist 
letters do. 
Because they act as private action prior restraints, cease-and-
desist letters can even be problematic in the context of sexually 
explicit uses of a trademark (for example, when a trademark is 
used in a pornographic film, as in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders268 
and Media Market Group).269  A comparison to obscenity law is 
instructive here.  As Lemley and Volokh emphasize, the Supreme 
Court has held that prior restraints on films not “‘finally 
adjudicated to be obscene’” were unconstitutional.270  It is 
troubling, therefore, that sexually explicit uses of a trademark are 
subject to much less protection in the pre-litigation and preliminary 
injunction context than allegedly obscene materials are.271  In this 
way, cease-and-desist letters can circumvent not only dilution 
requirements under the TDRA, but also entrenched First 
Amendment principles. 
4. Other Impediments Associated with the Cease-and-Desist 
Letter 
Not only do cease-and-desist letters often run contrary to 
established legal principles, they also rely on a likelihood that the 
recipient will be unsophisticated and lack the monetary resources 
necessary to mount a defense.  For this reason, scholars liken such 
behavior to “trademark extortion.”272  First, trademark owners rely 
 
 267 Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (N.D. Cal. 
2002).  Of course, the various circuits vary in their requirements for a preliminary 
injunction, but Media Market Group is an illustrative example. 
 268 See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 269 See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
 270 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 259, at 173 (quoting Vance v. Universal Amusement, 
445 U.S. 308 (1981)). 
 271 See Kravitz, supra note 75, at 150–51 (“This decision to enjoin showings of [Debbie 
Does Dallas] to protect the plaintiff’s reputational interest in its trademark cannot be 
reconciled with [F]irst [A]mendment principles.  There was no finding that the 
defendant’s film was obscene under [F]irst [A]mendment standards.”).  
 272 See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 585, 589 (2008); see also McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 64 
(quoting Port, supra, at 585).  
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on the fact that people making expressive uses of trademarks lack 
an understanding of the nuances of trademark law.273  Thus, the 
mark owners likely presume, in the face of uncertain legal 
standards and doctrines, recipients will accede to a cease-and-
desist letter rather than taking their chances in court.274  Because 
markholders especially target uses that reference sexuality or are 
sexually explicit, they may believe that the lack of clarity in 
tarnishment law could be a sufficient deterrent in and of itself. 
Second, it is likely that the cost of litigation will be daunting 
for the recipient of a cease-and-desist letter, and this will lead him 
or her to “settle the case and self-censor . . . speech rather than 
fight in court for the right to use particular language.”275  
Furthermore, those who do find representation are few and far 
between.276  The defendant in Walking Mountain Productions, 
Thomas Forsythe, for example, spent “five months searching for 
legal representation,” and during that time, a “‘long list of 
attorneys suggested that [he] just give up, since [he] hadn’t made 
any money anyway.”277  Eventually, the ACLU and a California 
firm agreed to represent him, but when all was said and done, his 
overall defense “topped two million dollars.”278  Pro bono 
 
 273 See McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 111 (“The more serious impact 
emerges earlier, before any suit is filed, when the chilling effects occur.  Imagine an 
average person—not a lawyer—who is contemplating an unlicensed expressive use of a 
trademark and understandably worries about liability.  The person asks an attorney for 
advice.  The bottom line of the response should be that courts usually favor expressive 
uses.  But, it will need to be accompanied by a lengthy memo, full of caveats, which cites 
in the alternative to a series of amorphous precedents, warns that those cases are all fact-
specific, and predicts that litigation may be protracted.  This response might not inspire 
great confidence.”); see also COOMBE, supra note 23, at 78 (“Faced with the threat of 
litigation, most local parodists, political activists, and satirical bootleggers will cease their 
activities.”).  
 274 See COOMBE, supra note 23, at 78. 
 275 Ramsay, supra note 29, at 405; see also McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals, 
supra note 197, at 1220 (“Cost is especially important because many cease-and-desist 
letters from well-financed markholders target isolated individuals using trademarks 
expressively.”).  
 276 See, e.g., McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals, supra note 197, at 1221.  
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. 
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representation for people like Thomas Forsythe and Justin Watt is 
the exception, not the rule.279 
D. Are Cease-and-Desist Letters a Replacement for a Lawsuit? 
Perhaps the most disturbing trend regarding cease-and-desist 
letters is that they may prove more efficacious than lawsuits.  As 
indicated above, the frequency of filed and litigated dilution 
lawsuits has dwindled since 1996.280  Overall “[t]rademark 
litigation has seen a precipitous drop since 2001.”281  At the same 
time, however, “the number of initial claims of trademark 
infringement filed per year is increasing.”282  Moreover, “[a]s the 
number of cases initially filed continues to go up, the percentage of 
cases that reach a trial on the merits, the total number of cases 
reported, the total amount of damages, and the total number of 
cases where an injunction is demanded are all decreasing.”283  
According to Professor Port, one explanation for these figures is 
trademark extortion: “[Trademark owners] file suit with no intent 
to prosecute it to a conclusion on the merits.  Therefore, the 
number of cases initially filed increases, but the number of cases 
that reach a trial on the merits remains constant and all other 
indicators decline.”284 
These numbers may be instructive in the cease-and-desist 
context as applied to tarnishment and other forms of action.  If 
trademark owners are increasingly filing weak lawsuits as a form 
 
 279 See also Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (2008) (defendant 
parodist of Wal-Mart’s mark was represented by Paul Alan Levy at Public Citizen, a 
nonprofit consumer advocacy group).   
 280 See supra Part I.B.5; see also Port, supra note 272, at 626 (“It may have been pent 
up demand or the novelty of the dilution cause of action that caused the larger numbers of 
dilution claims in the late 1990s, but there has been a general downward trend in dilution 
cases for eight of the ten years for which there is data.”). But see supra notes 178, 188, 
243.  
 281 Port, supra note 272, at 622. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. at 633.  For example, in 1995, 2595 infringement claims were filed, id. at 618 
(graph L), and 60 claims reached a trial on the merits, for a total percentage of 2.3% of all 
claims. Id. at 619 (graph N).  In 2005, however, 3636 claims were filed, id. at 618 (graph 
L), but only 51 claims reach a trial on the merits, for a total percentage of 1.43% of all 
claims. Id. at 619 (graph N). 
 284 Id. at 633. 
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of extortion to silence speech, they are probably also wielding a 
more potent and unregulated weapon in their arsenal even more 
frequently—the cease-and-desist letter.285  Indeed, the cease-and-
desist letter is quicker and cheaper than filing a trademark suit, and 
it is more efficacious. 
Thus, as these figures suggest and the analyses above indicate, 
there is much to be concerned about in the realm of pre-litigation 
cease-and-desist letters.  The following section will examine the 
routes courts and legislators should consider in curbing potentially 
abusive behavior. 
III. REMEDIES: DOCTRINAL AND PROCEDURAL 
As the previous sections have demonstrated, tarnishment law 
has played an increasingly smaller role in the courts, but may still 
be thriving in pre-litigation maneuvers.  At the same time, the 
recipients of cease-and-desist letters are at a disadvantage: they 
have less money to litigate than behemoth trademark owners do 
and are less knowledgeable about permissible uses of a trademark.  
On the one hand, honing tarnishment’s substantive law may create 
greater certainty for those familiar with trademark law.  A 
clarification in the law could delineate what kinds of sexually 
explicit material are tarnishing and what are not.  There is no 
guarantee, however, that the average cease-and-desist recipient 
will understand or have access to these clarified standards,286 nor 
that trademark owners will heed newly defined contours of 
tarnishment law.287  Thus, while doctrinal adjustments are useful, 
procedural mechanisms that punish and deter overreaching by 
trademark holders are necessary ingredients to protect trademark 
recoders.  This Part will examine some recent proposals to improve 
dilution law’s substantive standards, as well as trademark law’s 
 
 285 See id. at 589 (“[S]ome trademark holders send thousands of cease-and-desist letters 
to the point that there are now ‘sample’ cease-and-desist letters available on the internet.  
These cease-and-desist letters are followed by hundreds of trademark infringement 
filings.  These cases are almost never prosecuted to a conclusion on the merits.” 
(footnotes omitted)).   
 286 See supra notes 272–74 and accompanying text.  
 287 See infra Part III.A–B.  
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procedural mechanisms.288 Moreover, it will suggest that 
tarnishment may have outlived its usefulness and that other areas 
of the law could provide better protection for brands while being 
solicitous of speech concerns with respect to sex and sexuality. 
A. Doctrinal Adjustments 
1. Clarify the Exemptions in the TDRA 
Perhaps the best place to start in terms of doctrinal 
clarifications is with the language of the TDRA.  As discussed 
supra in Part I, the TDRA exempts fair uses of a mark “other than 
as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services” 
which includes parody, criticism of, or commentary on a mark.289  
It also exempts “any noncommercial use.”290  This creates a 
redundancy in the statute, as Professor McGeveran expresses: 
parody, comment, and critique all seem to fall under the rubric of 
“noncommercial use.”291  McGeveran’s solution to this issue is 
simple—he 
propose[s] that Judge Kozinski’s broad 
interpretation of the noncommercial use exemption 
from dilution liability should remain in force, either 
as a matter of consistent interpretation and 
constitutional avoidance or, if necessary, through 
amendment of the statute.  Any expressive use that 
does more than “propose a commercial transaction” 
should be immune from dilution liability, regardless 
of any other considerations.  Because there is no 
reason to limit this rule to federal dilution claims, 
courts should apply it to state claims as well.292 
At first blush, McGeveran’s proposal is a clear, administrable 
one, and it could help protect the interests of people who seek to 
expressively recode trademarks by referencing sexuality or 
 
 288 Note that this is just a sampling of attractive options.  A more fulsome examination 
of all options is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 289 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006).  
 290 Id. 
 291 See McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 108–09.  
 292 Id. at 116. 
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sexuality suggestive content.  At the same time, though, perhaps 
McGeveran’s proposal could run into the same difficulties faced 
by courts currently deciding dilution actions—how exactly does 
one define speech that “does more than ‘propose a commercial 
transaction’”?  Should this definition parallel analyses on broader 
First Amendment jurisprudence?293  Is this proposed exemption so 
broad that it swallows the rule?  Thus, though it seems to be a clear 
rule ex ante, its contours still contain ambiguity that either the 
courts or legislative action would need to dispel. 
2. Align the Contours of Tarnishment with Obscenity Law? 
In addition to a clarification of statutory exemptions, 
tarnishment law could benefit from a clearer definition of what 
uses are likely to tarnish a mark.  As discussed in Part I.B.3 supra, 
after the enactment of the FTDA in 1995, courts continued to rely 
on pre-FTDA language defining tarnishing uses.294  To wit: “a 
trademark may be tarnished when it is ‘. . . portrayed in an 
unwholesome or unsavory context,’ with the result that ‘the public 
will associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the 
defendant’s goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated goods.’”295 To 
courts, “unwholesome or unsavory” was (and sometimes still is) 
synonymous with “sexual activity [or] obscenity.”296  This 
language was too simplistic and helped lead some courts to make 
incorrect assessments of tarnishing uses.  Indeed, as one 
commentator has noted, subject-matter based assessments of 
tarnishment are 
untenable for two related reasons: (1) courts are not 
competent to make value judgments regarding the 
 
 293 See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding that 
unsolicited mailings are entitled to First Amendment protection as commercial speech).  
 294 See supra Part I.B.3.  
 295 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 
1994)).  
 296 See id. (citations omitted); see also V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 
382, 389 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Thus, any new mark with a lewd or offensive-to-some sexual 
association raises a strong inference of tarnishment.  The inference must be overcome by 
evidence that rebuts the probability that some consumers will find the new mark both 
offensive and harmful to the reputation and the favorable symbolism of the famous 
mark.”).  
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worth of different types of speech; and (2) courts 
will encounter a line-drawing problem, already 
evident in the case law.  The inherent problem with 
singling out cases for tarnishment liability based on 
the wholesomeness of their respective associations 
—for example, illegal drugs or pornography—is 
that courts are essentially permitted to make value 
judgments regarding the worthiness of specific 
types of speech.  An artist’s or commentator’s legal 
rights should not depend on whether an individual 
judge “gets” the humorist’s joke or the critic’s 
jab.297 
For example, in American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line 
Productions, Inc.,298 the district court granted an injunction against 
the use of the title “Dairy Queens” for an off-color comedy about 
beauty pageants on both infringement and tarnishment grounds.299  
Invoking the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders “alternative avenues” 
test, the court ruled that the movie title was a commercial use, and 
that it could have sought other ways to convey its message.300  It 
then proceeded to find a likelihood of dilution by tarnishment of 
the plaintiff’s “Dairy Queen” mark.301  According to the court, the 
film’s objectionable material included “backbiting and jealousy,” 
“eating disorders,” and “off-color humor.”302  Certainly this was a 
broad interpretation of what could “tarnish” a mark; it seems that 
any humor that was not squeaky-clean could have passed muster 
under the court’s assessment.  The district court in American Dairy 
Queen thus broadened the scope of tarnishment to any unwanted 
connotations of a mark. 
In the context of sexuality, if tarnishment has a substantive 
component, it should be no broader than truly obscene material 
under Miller v. California’s303 standards, and it should accord with 
 
 297 Gulasekaram, supra note 95, at 911.  
 298 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998).  
 299 Id. at 735.  
 300 Id. at 732.  This decision could also have benefited from a more liberal Kozinski-
esque conceptualization of “noncommercial use.” 
 301 Id. at 733.  
 302 Id. at 729. 
 303 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  The Miller obscenity test is as follows:  
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the noncommercial use exemption in the TDRA.  This approach 
could help assuage trademark holders’ understandable fears about 
truly disgusting commercial uses of their mark, without reaching 
expression that is merely off-color or even slightly offensive.  
Thus, commercial pornographic uses with no possible redeeming 
artistic virtues could be reached under such a standard.  One caveat 
to this approach is that the noncommercial use exemption could 
not be so broad so as to encompass all obscene uses.  
Noncommercial use and Judge Kozinki’s “noncommercial speech” 
formulation would require some line-drawing in order to appease 
legitimate trademark-holder concerns about truly denigrating and 
obscene uses of their marks.  This approach could further address 
concerns about the uses of child-oriented trademarks in truly 
explicit ways. 
B. Procedural Mechanisms 
Procedural mechanisms turn the focus on the more 
sophisticated party in cease-and-desist battle: the trademark owner.  
It is these mechanisms, perhaps more than a clarification of 
substantive standards, that can deter trademark overreaching by 
overzealous mark owners.  They thus can provide more clarity ex 
ante for trademark owners than doctrinal rules that may or not be 
malleable. 
1. Trademark Misuse 
Trademark misuse is an equitable defense akin to the doctrine 
of unclean hands.304  According to Professor McCarthy, it “does 
not form the basis for an affirmative claim for recovery.”305  While 
patent and copyright regimes have embraced some form of misuse, 
 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted). 
 304 See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 31:44 (4th ed. 2009). 
 305 Id. 
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“trademark misuse garners little acceptance from courts or 
commentators today.”306  As William E. Ridgway has noted, 
however, instituting some form of trademark misuse in litigation 
could be a potential deterrent against abusive and unmeritorious 
cease-and-desist letters, particularly when sent to individuals who 
engage in criticism or parody.307  Ridgway maintains that 
trademark misuse could protect speech interests in pre-litigation 
correspondence better than doctrinal protections in court can: 
 [C]ertain kinds of coercive conduct undermine 
free speech independent of formal First Amendment 
defenses—the paradigmatic example being pre-
litigation threats sent to alleged infringers or 
internet intermediaries based on dubious 
claims.  Misuse restores this constricted free speech 
space by providing a more aggressive weapon than 
a First Amendment shield.308 
Ridgway’s test is two-fold; it would examine (1) whether the 
trademark holder incorrectly asserts its rights, and (2) whether the 
trademark owner had an improper purpose in doing so.309  This 
doctrine could be subsumed under section 1115(b)(9) of the 
Lanham Act, as an equitable defense in litigation.310 
But Ridgway poses a more stringent and effective mechanism 
for using the trademark misuse doctrine—as an affirmative cause 
of action akin to section 512(f) of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (the “DMCA”).311  Such a provision would punish 
unmeritorious cease-and-desist letters by awarding costs and 
attorney’s fees, and, in the case of willful or knowing behavior, 
treble damages.312  One caveat to Ridgway’s affirmative cause of 
action, however, is the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, “which, on the 
basis of the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, immunizes from 
 
 306 Ridgway, supra note 233, at 1553.  
 307 See id. at 1548–49. 
 308 Id. at 1574. 
 309 Id. at 1566–67. 
 310 Id. at 1583–84; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(9) (2006) (“That equitable principles, 
including laches, estoppels, and acquiescence are also applicable.”). 
 311 See Ridgway, supra note 233, at 1586 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)).  
 312 Id. 
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liability individuals who petition the judiciary by, for example, 
bringing a lawsuit.”313  Immune petitioning will prevent liability 
from resulting, unless it is sham litigation.314  As Ridgway notes, 
most circuit courts hold that cease-and-desist letters enjoy 
immunity under the doctrine.315  The Tenth Circuit, however, has 
bucked this trend and held that the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
does not immunize private party pre-litigation correspondence.316 
If Ridgway’s proposal were to avoid any Noerr-Pennington 
difficulties, it could prove to be a formidable weapon in a would-
be trademark recoder’s arsenal.  When faced with a meritless 
cease-and-desist letter, he or she could have some degree of 
certainty that fighting the letter would not prove unduly 
burdensome.  The difficulty lies, as with doctrinal solutions, in the 
fact that recipients of cease-and-desist letters may not avail 
themselves of such a defense, and they may not understand which 
claims are truly abusive and meritless.  Moreover, some trademark 
holders might forge ahead with weak cease-and-desist claims 
without heeding such retributive consequences.  Nonetheless, the 
trademark misuse doctrine could prove a deterrent for many 
trademark holders who do not wish to risk paying costs, attorneys’ 
fees, or treble damages. 
2. Anti-SLAPP Protection 
Another prophylactic measure against unfounded cease-and-
desist tarnishment letters is protection under anti-SLAPP statutes. 
“SLAPPS are by definition meritless suits.  Plaintiffs intend not to 
win but to intimidate and harass political critics into silence.”317  
An anti-SLAPP statute protects against such meritless suits.318  
Such statutes generally include: 
 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Id. at 1587. 
 316 Id. (citing Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 889–90 
(10th Cir. 2000)).  
 317 John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problems of SLAPPs, 
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 399 (1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
 318 See Lauren McBrayer, Note, The DirecTV Cases: Applying Anti-Slapp Laws to 
Copyright Protection Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 603, 609–11 
(2005). 
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the establishment of a process for motions to 
dismiss or strike claims targeting public 
participation; the expedited hearing of such motions 
and suspension or significant curtailment of 
discovery until the court rules on the motion; and a 
cost-shifting award of attorneys fees and costs 
payable by the filer to the target when the target 
prevails on its motion to dismiss.319 
Under California’s anti-SLAPP laws, protection extends to the 
right of petition or free speech “in connection with a public issue 
or an issue of public interest.”320  At least twenty-six states in 
addition to California have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.321 
The prospect of anti-SLAPP protection for would-be 
defendants in trademark litigation could be a strong deterrent 
against trademark overreaching through cease-and-desist letters. 
Much like the trademark misuse doctrine, such protection focuses 
on the wrong-doing of the trademark holder, who is the party in a 
better position to know about the intricacies of trademark law.  As 
with trademark misuse, though, it is possible that an overzealous 
trademark holder may choose to ignore the possibility of anti-
SLAPP reprisals, relying on a would-be defendant’s lack of 
knowledge and sophistication in this area of the law. 
It is worth mentioning, though, that such protection is not 
unknown in trademark dilution cases.  In the Burnett case, for 
example, the defendant, Fox, filed a special motion to strike under 
California’s anti-SLAPP provision.322  Although the motion was 
mooted on jurisdictional grounds,323 it does illustrate that 
trademark defendants may use this tool as a weapon in their 
defensive arsenal, especially in the tarnishment arena.  Widespread 
availability of such a statute in trademark litigation may help curb 
pre-litigation abusive behavior, lest the overreaching plaintiff get 
 
 319 Id. at 610. 
 320 Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004)).  
 321 See CALIFORNIA ANTI-SLAPP PROJECT, http://www.casp.net/statutes/menstate.html 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2010).  
 322 Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (C.D. Cal. 
2007).  
 323 Id. at 974. 
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hit with an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss and face attorneys’ fees 
and costs. 
3. Fee-shifting 
As mentioned in the previous sections, fee-shifting may also 
work as a deterrent to trademark holders.  As Professor 
McGeveran suggests, 
fee-shifting is another possible procedural tool to 
discourage nonmeritorious litigation against 
expressive uses and support impecunious 
defendants.  There is already a provision of the 
Lanham Act allowing courts to impose defense 
costs on plaintiffs in “exceptional cases.”  The 
photographer in “Food Chain Barbie” secured this 
relief, but in general it is unusual.  This presumption 
should shift.  Courts should presume that 
unsuccessful lawsuits against expressive uses 
represent exceptional cases eligible for awards of 
attorneys’ fees unless the plaintiff can show that 
they were particularly close cases.324 
As McGeveran indicates, fee-shifting provisions may be a 
strong deterrent against the rampant practice of sending cease-and-
desist letters.  Such a provision could induce trademark holders to 
be more judicious with the claims that they file, and perhaps even 
in the claims they assert in pre-litigation correspondence.  
Trademark holders may find that it is not worth their while to risk 
losing costs and fees for claims that will, in the best possible 
outcome, get thrown out at the summary judgment phase. 
C. The Remedial Recipe? 
The remedy to frequent and often meritless cease-and-desist 
letters in the tarnishment arena thus must address substantive 
concerns (What is noncommercial use? What are the contours of 
tarnishment itself?), as well as procedural remedies that serve as 
stringent deterrents to trademark holders.  One drawback to these 
remedies, however, is that they involve doctrinal mechanisms 
 
 324 McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 31, at 123 (footnotes omitted).  
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asserted once litigation has begun.  As expressed above, recipients 
of cease-and-desist letters often capitulate to trademark holders’ 
demands before ever reaching the formal litigation stage.  Thus, 
such recipients may benefit from an affirmative cause of action at 
the pre-litigation stage based on the trademark misuse doctrine or 
anti-SLAPP statutes.   
One option that Congress should explore, for example, is an 
inexpensive and quick process to obtain declaratory judgment of 
the recoder’s expressive rights based upon a wrongful claim in a 
cease-and-desist letter.  Such a cause of action could be subsumed 
within the TDRA.325  Trademark holders, however, may try to 
invoke the Noerr-Pennington doctrine against such an affirmative 
cause of action, claiming that pre-litigation correspondence is 
proper petitioning to the government.  However, it is worth 
exploring this option for the sake of those who use trademarks in 
purely expressive, non-actionable ways, and who do not have the 
resources to defend their expressive rights at trial. 
D. Has Tarnishment Overstayed Its Welcome? 
While doctrinal adjustments and procedural mechanisms may 
afford recoders increased protections when they encounter cease-
and-desist letters that have no substantive bases in law, perhaps it 
is time to go further and reconsider tarnishment as a cause of 
action altogether.  As noted by Professor Beebe, dilution law in 
general largely has become redundant of trademark infringement 
actions.326  Tarnishment has lived on in cease-and-desist practice, 
however, and this is inherently problematic because, as noted in 
Part II.C, trademark holders may take advantage of unsophisticated 
recipients and malleable legal standards to silence speech in a 
private action form of restraint.  If tarnishment has all but 
disappeared in the courts, and is subject to being abused outside 
the courtroom, does it still serve a purpose?  Should we dispense 
with it altogether? 
 
 325 Cf. Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects?” 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 629–30 (2006) (detailing the remedies for bad 
faith DMCA takedowns codified in the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006)).  
 326 See Beebe, supra note 30, at 458–59. 
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As some scholars have suggested, product disparagement or 
trade libel law, which is a subset of defamation law, could address 
trademark owners’ concerns about brand image.327  Such a 
standard could hew closely to the general definition in section 
623A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for “Liability for 
Publication of Injurious Falsehood”: 
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the 
interests of another is subject to liability for 
pecuniary loss resulting to the other if 
(a)  he intends for publication of the statement 
to result in harm to interests of the other having 
a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should 
recognize that it is likely to do so, and 
(b)  he knows that the statement is false or acts 
in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.328 
Further, trademarks could fall under the rubric of public 
“figures,” who must meet an actual malice standard in order for 
their owners to collect damages under New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.329  Additionally, trade libel could reach only statements 
of fact, not opinion or fictional representations;330 such a standard 
would allow for recoders to enjoy greater leeway in using marks in 
expressive and artistic works regardless of the 
 
 327 See, e.g., Kravitz, supra note 75, at 152–53 (“Product disparagement laws, not 
tarnishment rationale, should set bounds on political and artistic commentary.  A 
trademark owner damaged by false and injurious statements of fact retains a cause of 
action.  But in fictional or satirical contexts where no statement of fact can reasonably be 
inferred, trademarks should not be protected against mere tarnishment by non-
commercial expression.  If Rev. Jerry Falwell cannot succeed on a cause of action against 
an advertising parody suggesting he had a sexual encounter with his mother while drunk 
in an outhouse, why should an inanimate trademark enjoy greater protection against 
similar slurs?” (footnotes omitted)); cf. Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution 
Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709, 721 
(2007) (“Tarnishment is like trade libel without the falsehood; instead of disparaging the 
product or service in a way that can be proven true or false, tarnishment is a less direct 
swipe, one which merely tries to alter public opinion rather than disseminate false 
information.”). 
 328 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977).  
 329 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 283–84 (1964); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 
623A, 626; Kravitz, supra note 75, at 152–53 (using Jerry Falwell as an example of a 
public figure). 
 330 See Kravitz, supra note 75, at 153. 
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commercial/noncommercial distinction.  The strict parameters of 
libel law could thus prevent overreaching by trademark holders 
while addressing legitimate concerns about truly harmful product 
disparagement.  While adopting this standard does not directly 
affect cease-and-desist practice per se, it would eliminate an 
amorphously powerful legal standard from a trademark holder’s 
arsenal. 
In addition, truly explicit uses of trademarks could fall directly 
under obscenity law.  It is true that obscenity law necessarily relies 
on community standards to deem whether a use is truly 
offensive,331 which may fall prey to the same concerns of 
subjective taste as an assessment of tarnishment would.  And yet, 
“community standards” refer to the community as a whole, and not 
just one particular judge or jury.  In addition, utilizing obscenity 
law to determine whether a use is legally “obscene” would allow 
for a more searching inquiry under the First Amendment than an 
assessment of tarnishment would afford.332 
This section does not purport to exhaust all the possible 
substitutions for tarnishment as a cause of action, nor does it seek 
to address all the ramifications of eliminating tarnishment from 
trademark law.  It merely suggests that perhaps we can better 
address expressive interests and legitimate trademark owners’ 
concerns in a different legal arena.  Perhaps, however, relying on 
trade disparagement and obscenity laws will merely shift cease-
and-desist practice to focus on these doctrines instead.  Perhaps 
trademark owners will fall back on an old friend—plain vanilla 
trademark infringement—to protect brand image.  But it may just 
be that removing tarnishment from markholders’ arsenals will 
begin to reign in the kind of overreaching that the TDRA 
exemptions and relevant case law have not prevented. 
 
 331 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1974); supra note 303. 
 332 See Ramsay, supra note 29, at 413 (noting that courts generally view trademarks as 
“speech that is protected by the First Amendment but subject to more regulation than 
other types of fully protected speech”).  
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CONCLUSION 
Since the enactment of the FTDA and the TDRA, courts have 
largely fallen out of love with the tarnishment cause of action.  
Plaintiffs bring these claims less frequently and have less frequent 
success.  While the substantive law of tarnishment has arguably 
become more favorable to expressive uses, even when those uses 
toe the line of propriety, trademark owners have turned to out-of-
court measures to protect brand images.  Cease-and-desist letters 
based on tarnishment have thus increased, and it is likely that the 
amount of speech chilled by these letters has increased as well.  
These propositions have become evident as websites like the 
Chilling Effects Clearinghouse document the scope and frequency 
of cease-and-desist letters.  However, the lucky few who can afford 
to fight claims of tarnishment or who can obtain pro bono legal 
representation (Justin Watt, the Courage Campaign, Thomas 
Forsythe) are few and far between. 
The stakes are high in this area of law.  Would-be recoders and 
brand commentators need to know that their creative reimaginings 
will not land them in court.  Thus, as this Note has tried to 
demonstrate, the law needs to change substantively, and it needs to 
afford clear procedural mechanisms for these individuals to assert 
their rights.  As Judge Kozinski presciently observed, trademark 
owners “must give up some measure of control” 333 when their 
brands become part of pop culture.  They must understand that not 
all interpretations of trademarks will be favorable or in line with 
the image they cultivate.  Most importantly, though, they must 
understand that there are limits to the amount of trademark 
protection they receive,334 and that overzealous assertions of their 
trademark rights through tarnishment claims is bad behavior, plain 
and simple. 
 
 
 333 Kozinski, supra note 1, at 975. 
 334 See Leval, Trademark, supra note 142, at 205 (“The purpose of the trademark laws 
is not to prevent people from saying nasty things about others but to permit entities in 
commerce to identify their goods or services to the public.”). 
